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ABSTRACT
In Japan, disputes over highway projects from residents are now drawing more attention
than ever. However, these disputes are rarely resolved through conventional processes
using the decide-announce-defend approach. In many cases, dissatisfied opponents try to
impede their implementation through litigation and physical obstruction.
In the United States, oppositions against interstate highway projects started in late 1960s.
Political actions and environmental legislation enabled urban residents and
environmentalists to stop highway projects.
In response, consensual approaches to resolving public disputes, including mediation and
consensus building, were developed. They are intended to resolve or forestall disputes
with an assistance of non-partisan professionals under informal settings. Since mid-70s,
they have been successfully applied to resolving disputes over and making decisions on
highway projects.
However, informal negotiation among various stakeholders has not yet been used in
highway disputes in Japan. A thought experiment was conducted to identify prospects and
pitfalls to identify problems in using the consensual approach in Japan. It crystallized four
major concerns of Japanese highway professionals. Following the thought experiment, the
author proposes five strategies to promote the consensual approach in planning highways in
Japan.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence E. Susskind
Title: Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning
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No man, when he hath lighted a candle, covereth it with a vessel, or
putteth it under a bed; but setteth it on a candlestick, that they
which enter in may see the light.
New Testament (Luke 8:16)
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Introduction
In Japan, highway disputes are increasing in number and escalating in substance.
Highway projects are protested mainly because of their environmental impacts -noise and
air pollution- caused by increased traffics. On the other hand, more highway
constructions are needed because of increasing ownership of private automobiles and
dependence of business activities on trucks. Traffic congestion on the existing arteries is
causing health problems on people living nearby these arteries.
Therefore, conflicts between local needs and regional/national needs are
unavoidable. Currently, national government tries to represent the national needs. Most
of all the highway projects in Japan are prepared by the national government with their
"objective" analysis. Local oppositions become apparent only after the authorities
announce projects to local residents. In the face of oppositions, the officials persistently
follow the conventional Urban Planing and Environmental Impact Analysis process, which
usually do not lead to a settlement of the conflicts. Frustrated opponents often bring cases
to courts or try to obstruct the implementation of the projects. Such conflicts are
beneficial to neither officials nor opponents.
The United States also experienced disputes over interstate highway projects in the
late 1960s. Urban residents and environmentalists could not tolerate the ideal of suburbia
-living in suburbs and commuting on highways- that evoked demolition of urban and
natural environment. Political actions and new legislation, such as the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), gave them leverages to stop highway projects. Some
oppositions were so harsh that forced some projects to be canceled. For example,
Massachusetts governor Sergent announced a moratorium on major highway projects
around Boston in 1970. Public officials recognized a need for a consensus with diverse
stakeholders after the harsh battles through litigation and politics.
In response to environmental disputes over public policies, mediation came into
light. Mediation is an informal measure to resolve disputes with assistance of non-partisan
professionals in dispute resolution. The history of mediation in the United States dates
back to the early 20th century, but its application to environmental disputes began in the
1960s. Its first application to highway dispute was the 1-90 case in the State of
Washington.1 Since then, mediation has achieved great successes in settling highway
disputes. Professional neutrals have also been involved in highway planning, such as
public involvement process of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
(ISTEA), to forestall future disputes. Such efforts are called consensus building.
"Considering the successes in the United States, is it possible to use
mediation and consensus building in planning highways in Japan?"
"What are prospects and pitfalls?"
"What should be done to promote the consensual approach?"
This thesis attempts to investigate the possibility of using mediation and consensus
building in Japanese highway planning. It focuses on the perception of professionals in
Japan -government officials, professors, lawyers/activists, and consultants- to answer the
questions above.
Chapter One is a brief summary of the consensual approach. General concepts of
conflict management and negotiation are first summarized. Shortcomings of the
conventional decision-making process and merits of the consensual approach -mediation
and consensus building- will be discussed. Distinction between consensus building and
public involvement will be clarified. Finally, obstacles to using the consensual approach
will be discussed.
Chapter Two discusses the highway planning process in the United States and
Japan. The evolution of participatory processes of the interstate highway program in the
Patton, L. and Cormick, G., "Mediation and the NEPA Process: The Interstate 90 Experience,"
Environmental Impact Analysis: Emerging Issues in Planning, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1977
US is chronologically summarized. This includes brief discussions about environmental
legislation in 1970s and a historically important case in Boston. Highway planning
process in Japan is also reviewed. The final part of this chapter discusses obstacles to
using the consensual approach in Japan.
Chapter Three introduces two case studies: Route 2A case in Lexington,
Massachusetts and Yokohama Circular Highway (YCH) South Project case. A protracted
dispute over Route 2A widening project was mediated in only nine months. It was a
highly successful highway mediation in the United States. On the contrary, the YCH
project is still under attack by the local residents and in litigation. It is a typical
controversial highway project around Tokyo metropolitan region. These two cases are
compared according to four criteria proposed by Susskind and Cruikshank (1981).2 Then,
possible obstacles to using mediation/consensus building in these cases will be discussed.
Chapter Four is a thought experiment. The author proposed an alternative
consensus building process to the actual process in planning the YCH project. The
proposal has been evaluated by professionals in highway planning in Japan. It
substantiated their four major concerns.
Chapter Five proposes five strategies to promote the consensual approach to
highway planning in Japan using the analysis in the previous chapters. The strategies are:
+ Remove misperceptions about the consensual approach.
+ Encourage government officials to try the consensual approach in less
controversial small projects
+ Encourage professors and other neutral individuals to assist informal
negotiations
+ Mobilize political actions to encourage the use of the consensual approach
+ Integrate the consensual approach into the formal environmental mediation
procedures
2 Susskind, L. and Cruikshank, J., Breaking the Impasse, Basic Books, New York, 1987
Chapter 1
Theory of Mediation and Consensus Building
Fundamental Theories of Dispute Resolution
Types of Conflict Management
In most societies, cooperation among individuals is crucial to maintain peace.
However, these people think, behave, and believe differently, and these differences create
conflict. Subgroups also have different views, giving rise to conflict among groups.
People have devised many measures to resolve conflicts and promote cooperation.
Moore (1996)3 categorizes various measures (see Figure 1-1).4 The least active measure is
conflict avoidance, in which people just ignore existing conflict for various reasons and let
it continue. Conflict avoidance occurs between those who put a high value on harmony,
like family members. Although such a strategy would avoid raising tensions among
stakeholders, it leaves the benefits of exploring differences unattended. In other word,
conflict avoidance does not yield an optimal solution.
The most active and coercive response is violence, in which people use physical force
to try to change other side's behavior or beliefs. Its extreme is war. As we see in many
societies, violence is often condemned by law, and we can hardly legitimize such a strategy.
Moore argues that the conflict management strategies to the right in Figure 1-1 are
more likely to generate win-lose outcomes. In his definition, a win-lose outcome means
that some parties fully satisfy their interests and others do not. Such an outcome is not
undesirable per se, although it should be probably avoided in public policy debates.
3 Moore, C., The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco,
1996, pp. 6-12
4 Other scholars also articulated different categorizations. The Kettering Foundation, "The Basics of
Negotiation," Successful Negotiating in Local Government, ICMA, Washington DC, 1985 uses Fighting,
Avoiding, Substituting, Adjudicating, and Negotiating.
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Figure 1-1: Continuum of Conflict Management and Resolution Approaches
(Moore (1996)5)
Negotiation
Negotiation is "the most common way to reach a mutually acceptable agreement" in
the face of conflict6  According to Moore's criteria, negotiation, including informal
discussions and mediation, is unlikely to produce win-lose outcomes. However, that is not
necessarily a truth. The risk of reaching a win-lose agreement through negotiations has
been extensively discussed.
Whether a negotiator wins or loses is not defined by the outcome relative to the
other's outcome. That kind of scoring system is often found in sport games; those who
scored more wins, irrespective of how much one scored. Instead, the concept of winning
and losing is defined by the outcome relative to the Best Alternative To Negotiated
Agreement which is often abbreviated as BATNA (Fisher and Ury(1991)).7
BATNA is an expected outcome to a negotiating party if the parties can not reach an
agreement. For example, it can be a settlement by court or an agreement with still other
parties. If a party's outcome is perceived to be better than its BATNA, the party is
considered to be a winner, no matter how better the outcome is than its BATNA. Given
this definition, win-lose outcomes through negotiation are not desirable to the losers,
because they could have moved to other leverages to pursue their interests. In other
words, they should have pursued a strategy that would lead them to their BATNA.
Fisher and Ury (1991)8 describe how to negotiate to reach a Win-win outcome. The
centerpiece of their argument is to separate a party's positions from its interests. Through
what they call principled negotiation, parties identify what is their and their adversaries'
interests, and trade what the others value more with what they values more. Such trades
increase both parties' utilities. This approach is also called the mutual gains approach.
It draws on Pareto, an economist in the early 2 0th century.
6 Moore, Op. Cit., p. 8
7 Fisher, R. and Ury, W., Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, Penguin Books, New
York, 1991, p. 10 0
8 Fisher, R. and Ury, W., Op. Cit.
Figure 1-2: Two-Party Negotiation Arithmetic
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However, there is a limit to such trades. When all the parties have exhausted all the
possible trades, the state is called Pareto Optimal, which is assumed to be one of the most
efficient outcomes. There are multiple Pareto Optimal solutions; this collection is called
Pareto Frontier. Any outcome cannot be more efficient as Pareto Optimal solution.
Figure 1-2 mathematically illustrates how the mutual gains approach works in two-
party (person A and person B) negotiation. Each party is assumed to benefit certain
utilities from the status quo, and their interest is to increase their own utilities. In the
diagram (a), each party is claiming their positions that the other party cannot accept,
because each of the position would give other party a less satisfaction than the other's
BATNA. If they stick to their positions, they will not be able to reach an agreement. For
example, if they bring this case to court, the court only chooses one of their positions, and
inevitably one of them will "lose" because the outcome is worse than BATNA for the loser.
If they could focus on their interests and BATNA, and could find trades between
them, both of their utilities would increase, which is illustrated in the diagram (b). Their
initial positions are same as those of the case (a), but they realized that the court decision
could be much worse than their BATNA. They also realized that there is a zone of
possible agreement (ZOPA), which is represented by the area surrounded by the line of
BANTA and the efficiency frontier.9 So they disengaged from their positions, and began
to offer other options. Finally, they could reach an agreement the satisfactions of which to
both A and B are almost same as those from their initial position.
Assisted Negotiation
-Facilitation, Mediation, and Arbitration-
Although all disputing parties seem to be able to resolve their differences through
negotiation and reach a creative settlement, they often face an impasse along the way. The
process that bogs them down or cause stalemate is escalation. All the negotiation has
creating and claiming aspects. Even though the negotiators understood that the "pie" can
be enlarged by cooperative actions, the latter aspect of negotiation can be too attractive to
overclaim one's share of the enlarged pie. Bazerman(1993) lists four complementary
reasons for the overclaiming.10
First, once negotiators make an initial commitment to a position, they are more likely to
notice information that supports their initial evaluation of the situation. Second, their
judgment is biased to interpret what they see and hear in a way that justifies their initial
position. Third, negotiators often increase their demands or hold out too long to save
face with their constituency... Finally, the competitive context of the negotiation adds to
the likelihood of escalation.
Negotiators in general lack enough skills to deal with the problems innate in the
negotiation itself, especially faced with complicated conflicts.
In such cases, they can seek an assistance by professional neutrals. Negotiation with
an assistance is generally called assisted negotiation. The basic assumption of assisted
negotiation is that one or more individuals without direct relationships with the outcome of
a negotiation assist the disputing parties to reach a settlement.
The positive effects of assistance may vary by the level of the intervention by the
neutrals. Rubin (1994)" summarizes as follows:
The mere presence of a third party, either in contractual or emergent intervention, is likely
to profoundly change the interactions between Party and Other. Under most
circumstances, such change is likely to be beneficial.
(continued)
9 ZOPA is also called bargaining set. See, Lax, D. and Sebenius, J., The Manager as Negotiator:
Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain, Free Press, New York, 1986, pp. 247-249
10 Bazerman, M., "Why Negotiations Go Wrong," Negotiation: Readings, Exercises, and Cases Ed. Lewicki et
al, Irwin, Burr Ridge, Ill., 1993, p. 205
" Rubin, J., Pruitt, D., and Kim, S., Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, McGraw-Hill,
New York, 1994, p. 1 9 8
The roles of professional neutrals are so diverse that they range from moderating
meetings to drafting an agreement. Basically, their level of intervention varies according
to the types of their services. In general, assisted negotiation is categorized into three
forms: facilitation, mediation, arbitration. However, these three forms are not definitive
and mutually exclusive.' 2
In facilitation, a facilitator's intervention is usually limited to the management of
meetings. Doyle et al (1976)'1 says:
The facilitator is a meeting chauffeur, a servant of the group. Neutral and
nonevaluating, the facilitator is responsible for making sure the participants are using the
most effective methods for accomplishing their task in the shortest time.
For example, he or she tries to ensure the full participation of stakeholders, sets up the
meeting place, summarizes the dialogue with the help of recorders, and makes sure all the
participants have equal voice. However, the facilitator does not meet with the participants
outside the meetings. His/her service is limited within the time of meeting.
According to Moore ibid., mediation is "generally defined as the intervention in a
negotiation or a conflict of an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative
decision-making power but who assists the involved parties in voluntarily reaching a
mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute."' 4  Compared to the facilitator, a
mediator is assumed to take more responsibility in helping disputants reach an agreement.
Before holding meetings, mediator tries to contact all possible stakeholders to identify those
who can influence the outcome from an agreement. Between meetings, a mediator can
confidentially meet with the participants to identify possible deals between them.
1 see Figure 1-1. Moore, Op. Cit., does not include "facilitation" in his categories.
13 Doyle, M. and Straus, D., How to Make Meetings Work, Jove, New York, 1982, p.3 5
14Moore, Op. Cit., p.15
Arbitration is somewhat different from these two systems in that an arbitrator is
assigned with the decision-making authority. Disputing parties first agree to bound by the
decision of an arbitrator of their choice. After hearing their arguments, the arbitrator
renders a settlement. Arbitration is somewhat akin to the court system because an
arbitrator dictates his settlement. It has been used mostly for private-sector disputes, such
as those related to real estate transactions.
Collaborative Public Decision-Making
Flaws of Conventional Decision-Making Process
Traditionally, public officials have sought to gain public support for their projects by
relying on technical expertise. The key assumption in this approach is that the planners
can provide the best solution to problems (Susskind and Ozawa (1984)15). In addition, the
planner's scientific and technical analysis is assumed to be objective and complete. This
approach is called "decide-announce-defend" or "plan-announce-defend-implement"
16 17 18(O'Hare et al (1983) , Susskind and Laws (1994)", and Urban Land Institute (1994) ).
Such conventional approaches have been criticized by the advocates of collaborative
decision-making process. Urban Land Institute ibid. argues as follows:
When these strategies are used, the interests of concerned citizens and groups are
delegitimized, if not altogether ignored. Many of these groups will fight back, attacking
the process, the outcome, and the individuals responsible. If the opposition is well
organized and the back lash strong enough, policy gridlock results. The traditional
process thus becomes stuck in the defense stage, implementation is impossible unless the
fighting ends and a degree of consensus is established.
In more general terms, Susskind and Cruikshank (1987)19 criticize adjudicative
measures like judicial and administrative decisions, and referendums as insufficient in
15 Susskind, L., and Ozawa, C., "Mediated Negotiation in the Public Sector: The Planner as Mediator,"
Journal of Planning Education and Research, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1984
16 O'Hare, M., Bacow, L., and Sanderson, D., Facility Siting and Public Opposition, Van Nostrand Reinhold,
New York, 1983
17 Susskind, L., and Laws, D., "Siting Solid Waste Facilities in the United States," Handbook of Solid Waste
Management, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1994
18 Urban Land Institute, Pulling Together: A Planning and Development Consensus-Building Manual,
Washington DC, 1994, pp. 16-19
19 Susskind, L., and Cruikshank, J., Op. Cit.
Figure 1-3: The Conventional Decision-Making Process
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(Urban Land Institute (1994)" )
facilitating win-win outcomes in distributional disputes. 2 0  They list five major flaws in the
representative democracy in the United States as follows: 2 1
* The Tyranny of the Majority
Those who can form a strong coalition become influential, and minorities might lose
" Lack of Long-Term Commitment
Fluctuations in politics leads to short-term solutions.
. Shortcomings of the Voting Process
It can deal only with Yes-No questions. It is not an effective tool to express specific
interests.
* Technical Complexity Overwhelms Sloganeering
Commitment to a single slogan might disband when people face technical issues in
detail.
" The Winner-Takes-All Mind-Set
Court cannot and wouldn't facilitate compromisory settlement, and yields binary
judgments. Court also wouldn't take scientific study.
20 They do not discuss much about another type of disputes that "center primarily on the definition of
constitutional or legal rights" because they "hinge primarily on interpretations by the courts of guaranteed
rights," Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit., 1987, p. 17
21 Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit., 1987, pp. 39-76
22 Urban Land Institute, Op. Cit., p. 17
In addition, the existence of the nonobjective judgments also can de-legitimatize the
image of non-partisan planners. Susskind and Dunlap(198 1)23 illustrates how
nonobjective judgments can affect the presentation and decision-making process of the
environmental impact assessment. Assumptions in creating forecasting models can be
influenced by perceptions of those who produce them, even if they do not have direct
interests with a project that is being evaluated. It can also lead to advocacy science with
which contending parties use scientificfacts that support their position as Ozawa and
Susskind claim: 24
... it is usually assumed that scientific experts stand apart from the "political" area in
which decision makers and affected interests operates.
... political objectives can prevail as easily as technical ones. Several authors have
observed that decision makers (and affected interests) tend to place especially heavy
weight on scientific advice when it happens to support a decision they prefer on other
grounds, and that they tend to place little weight on such advice when it conflicts with
their political preferences.
Consensual Approach to Negotiated Agreement
In response to these flaws of conventional process, an alternative approach to public
decision-making has been proposed. Susskind and Cruikshank25 suggests a consensual
approach to negotiated agreement. Compared to the conventional process, the approach
encompasses informal negotiations between all stakeholders of a public decision.
Although the approach is supplemental to the formal process, a consensus must be reached
23 Susskind, L., and Dunlap, L., "The Importance of Non-Objective Judgments in Environmental Impact
Assessment," Environmental Impact Assessment Review, Vol. 2, No. 4, 198124 Ozawa, C., and Susskind, L., "Mediating Science-Intensive Policy Disputes," Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1985
25 Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit., 1987
through negotiation. To reach a consensus, principled negotiation, which is described
before, needs to be applied, and they claims that assisted negotiation is often necessary.
They argue four good outcomes of negotiated settlements as follows: 26
1) Fairness
Negotiated settlements are likely to produce better perception of the participants about
fairness. However, they are not focusing on the fairness of an outcome of a negotiation,
but its process. They agrees:
... there is no single indicator of substantive fairness that all parties to a public dispute are
likely to accept. In our fieldwork, therefore, we avoid ironclad determinations of
fairness. We simply affirm that in a public dispute, a good process produces a good
outcome
2) Efficiency
The approach facilitates a trust between the parties and a climate where they listen to
each other, which are indispensable for an efficient outcome to be reached. In addition, a
consensus can forestall a potential protracted lawsuits. However, some trade-offs between
fairness and efficiency are inevitable.
3) Wisdom
Through collaborative inquiry into the fact, the best available resources can be applied
without the risk of advocacy science.
4) Stability
As all the stakeholders participate in the process, the agreement is owned by the
participants, which substantially contributes to the stability of an agreement.
26 Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit., 1987, pp. 2 1-33
In addition, Innes et al (1994)27 focuses on long-term effect of consensus, using
fourteen case studies of consensus building efforts in California. They discuss that these
efforts created Social, Intellectual and Political Capital. They define these terms in the
following manner:
Social capital, in the form of trust, norms of behavior, and networks of communication,
creates the potential for serious discussion to take place among otherwise conflicting
stakeholders. Intellectual capital, in the form of shared and agreed-upon facts and
understandings, provides common basis for discussion and moves the players toward
agreement on policy issues. Political capital, in the form of alliances and agreements on
proposals that provide mutual gains, creates the possibility that proposals will be adopted
and implemented in the political arena.
As we see, consensual approach is likely to produce better outcomes than the
conventional process is, if the decision at stake does not encompass constitutional or legal
rights. In the next section, we will investigate the use of assisted negotiation in making
public policy decisions in more detail.
27 Innes, J., Gruber, J., Neuman, M., and Thompson, R., Coordinating Growth and Environmental
Management through Consensus Building, California Policy Seminar, Berkeley, 1994
Mediation/Consensus-Building in Public Decision-Making
In this section, I will discuss how the consensusal approach can proceed with an
assistance of professional neutrals, especially in the context of mediation and
consensus-building. This part extensively draws on Susskind and Cruikshank's
"Breaking the Impasse."28 Then, I will discuss the definition of mediation and
consensus building.
Consensual Approach with Assisted Negotiation
Susskind and Cruikshank define three phases in reaching a consensus through
negotiation. They are Pre-Negotiation, Negotiation, and Post-Negotiation Phase. The
level of intervention by intermediaries may differ according to the type of assistant parties
seek, but in this section, I will discuss the mediation and consensus-building process.
These two process may slightly vary in the early stages of the process, but I will discuss the
general aspect of these two process. You can find the process in more detail in Chapter 4,
where I suggest an alternative to the conventional process in Japan.
Pre-Negotiation Phase
Before starting discussing the substantive issues of dispute, disputing parties, with the
help of professional neutrals, should finish a comprehensive preparation. Skipping over
this preparation would result in the repetition of the dispute they had experienced. Pre-
negotiation phase has four steps. In getting started, stakeholders need to start dialogue.
The possibility of intervention by third party neutrals can be raised by any of the relevant
28 Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit., 1987
Table 1-1: Three Phases of the Consensual Approach
Implementation or Postnegotiation
Prenegotiation Phase Negotiation Phase Phase
" Getting Started * Inventing Options for Mutual 9 Linking Informal Agreements
" Representation Gain to Formal Decision Making
" Drafting Protocols and Setting 9 Packaging Agreements 9 Monitoring
the Agenda * Producing a Written * Creating a Context for
" Joint Fact Finding Agreement Renegotiation
9 Binding the Parties to Their
Commitments
0 Ratification
(Susskind and Cruikshank (1987)29)
parties, disinterested third parties, or the neutrals by themselves. In cases where they have
already experienced harsh battles through court or media, they might be reluctant to see
each other's face. An experienced neutral can contact potential stakeholders to invite
them to the table, arguing the voluntary nature of the process. The dialogue is initiated by
the neutral, not by any of the stakeholders, and thus all stakeholders can save their face.
While bring them to the table, he or she also should identify the interests and concerns of
the parties.
In representation, stakeholding organizations should identify representatives. The
neutral should encourage them to choose a representative with an authority. If a
representative cannot gain support of his/her constituency after reaching an agreement with
other representatives, the process can be totally fruitless. When the outcome of the
potential agreement seem to affect broad public, the neutral should identify the stakeholders
currently not involved in the process and invite them. Otherwise, the stability of the
agreement is at stake: it can be protested by these people in the future.
In drafting protocols and agenda setting, all participants of the process should agree
to protocols and an agenda. Protocols define the logistics of the process. It might
include the place to hold the meetings, the deadline to reach an agreement, and the way to
recognize a person to speak. The neutral can bring draft protocols based on his/her
experience in the past, which can help the participants proceed faster. Agenda is a list of
issues to be discussed in the meetings. At the outset, the participants may find difficulties
in reaching an agreement on their agenda, but the neutral can also prepare a draft with the
result of interviews he/she conducted. They can add or subtract some items from the
agenda later. Protocols and agenda will be the most important tools for the neutral to
manage the meetings afterwards.
Jointfactfinding is a process in which the participants work together to answer
"What do we know, and what don't we know about the issues, contexts, and experience
relevant to dispute?"30 As the participants often have to investigate scientific and
technical issues, the neutral can accommodate professionals to assist their investigations.
When pros and cons of certain projects are putting forward scientific facts that support their
position, this process can disengage them from the pitfall of advocacy science, which was
discussed in the previous section.
Negotiation-Phase
When they shared the understanding of current conditions and forecast methods, they
should start inventing possible actions to be involved in the agreement. In inventing
options, the neutral uses a technique called brainstorming to help them create maximum
possible numbers of options so that the final agreement will be the most creative solution
(see the next section for more about brainstorming). No one should make comments
evaluating other's proposals to facilitate the discussion. Some proposals may seem to be
benefiting only one party, but whether one party accepts the proposal should be left for the
negotiation later on.
When the participants exhausted their options, they should start packaging their
agreement. In principle, packaging is the process of exchanging the item that the
(continued)
29 Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit., 1987, p.9530 Susskind and Cruikshank., Op. Cit., 1987, p.113
disputants value differently to attain a Pareto superior condition, which was described in the
previous chapter. Assume that two options, A and B, were found in the inventing options
stage, and both of them could be implemented at once. If party #1 values Option A higher
than Option B, and if party #2 does vice versa, they can reach an agreement to implement
both A and B. Such agreement would be better than having no agreement. In other
words, they could find a solution that is better than their BATNAs. However, either of
them might be reluctant to make a first offer because the other party might expect the party
to make more generous offers. In such cases, the neutral can caucus with each party
confidentially, and look for a possible package that both parties might agree keeping the
gathered information confidential. When the neutral could find one, he/she can propose as
a package before them.
Even if they could reach a firm agreement orally, the should produce a written
agreement because they should 1) clearly understand the agreement and 2) bring the
agreement to their constituencies. However, if each participant brought his/her own drafts,
the substance of the draft could be worded to favor his/her own interests, and thus they
would have to reach an agreement on their agreement. Instead, the neutral assistant should
prepare the draft for them, and edit it according to responses from the parties. This
approach is called single text approach. They have to include some clauses on the ways to
ensure that the agreement will be observed. In binding parties to commitments, they have
to devise a measure to evaluate the agreement's performance and enforce the agreement
when it is not realized.
Then, the people represented at these negotiation should bring the written agreement
back to their constituencies. In ratification, the written agreement should be authorized by
the groups or organizations that sent the representative. As the neutrals and participants of
the process checked whether each representative really represents his/her constituency in
the representation stage, it is unlikely that the written agreement will be denied at this late
stage. However, the neutrals should assist each representative in gaining support for the
written agreement. He/she can explain how well the representative negotiated, and how
creative the agreement is.
Post-Negotiation Phase
Even though they signed an agreement, the government's formal action should follow
in linking the informal agreement to the formal processes of government decision making.
The agreement and the government's formal decision-making are different. Government
officials are often not allowed to confer their authority to other parties, and the process to
reach an agreement cannot be a formal process. Thus, the government should make a
formal decision based on the agreement.
Monitoring implementation is often important in this phase, especially when the
parties reached an agreement that is contingent on its outcomes. For example, a party
might guarantee to mitigate environmental damages when they are significant. If so, all
parties should check conditions of the environment and how the agreement is being
observed. In such cases, the parties should include a monitoring plan in their agreement to
forestall future conflicts.
The final step is creating a contextfor renegotiation. When something goes wrong
afterwards, they should reconvene to discuss problems to prevent the whole effort from
being in vain. The agreement should stipulate when and how the parties will renegotiate.
Mediation and Consensus Building
Both mediation and consensus building should follow the process described above.
The major differences of these process could be 1) the stage of planning process they are
used, 2) the difficulties in raising the stakeholders' interests in the process, and 3) their
historical background.
Mediation often associated with Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), which refers
to the methods of revolving dispute outside the court system. Compared to consensus
building, mediation is aimed to help disputing parties settle a dispute that reached an
impasse. Therefore, it can be used as a remedy to the protracted disputes as a result of the
decide-announce-defend approach.
Consensus building effort is aimed to avoid a potential dispute in making public
policies. The agencies or government which hold the authority to decide a certain policy
or project should initiate the consensus building process before making decisions. The
agreement with the diverse stakeholders will be the basis of their final policy or project;
thus even internal decisions, as is often seen in the decide-announce-defend approach,
should not be made in advance. Consensus building is sometimes considered to be a type
of facilitation,3 1 but I contend that it be more like a mediation in that the level of neutral's
intervention is not limited to the actual meetings.32
This aspect of consensus building can evoke a difficulty in bringing the people with a
stake in the outcome of the process to the table. Although the professional neutrals should
strive to identify all these people, they might find little benefit from using their resources,
such as their time and cost to participate. This could result in the few participation of the
stakeholders, and thus makes process less accountable. The problem has been debated for
a long time in relation to the public participation effort.
The last point is the history of mediation and consensus building. Mediation has
long been extensively used in all over the world. In the United States, mediation was
institutionally used for labor-management relations early in the 20th century. 33  There is no
record of the historical aspect of consensus building efforts, but it seems to have started in
1970s.34  Its application to making federal regulations, which are often called regulatory
negotiations or "Reg-Negs," started in the late 1970s.
31 Massachusetts Office of Dispute Resolution, Facilitation and Process Consultation, leaflet.
32 Moore, Op. Cit., deals consensus building efforts as mediation. p. 29
33 Moore, Op. Cit., p.23
3 I assume the Alewife Task Force starting in 1975 was the first case. For Alewife case, see Susskind, L.,
The Importance of Citizen Participation and Consensus Building in the Land Use Planning Process,
Environmental Impact Assessment Project, Laboratory of Arch. and Planning, MIT, 1977
Consensus Building and Public InovIvement
The term public involvement and consensus building are often understood in a same
way because both techniques are assumed to be used before disputes occur, and they are
basically composed of interaction between several stakeholders. However, the Consensus
Building Institute (1995)35 clarifies the difference between consensus building and public
involvement. There are three key issues.
1. Commitment of participants
Public Involvement: "... the goal of public involvement is often to share information with
the public and then invite comment."
Consensus Building: "... consensus building creates a forum where multiple stakeholders
can participate in shared decision-making."
However, this does not suggest that the formal authorities are given to such forums. The
report claims that "consensus building aims to supplement conventional governmental
decision making by offering stakeholders a way of voicing their ideas and concerns."
2. Participation
Public Involvement: "... are usually open to anyone who wants to participate... these
effort typically engage the public on ad hoc, meeting by meeting basis."
Consensus Building: "... an agency identifies a group of individuals who can represent
various stakeholder group, often with the help of a professional neutral. These
individuals are then invited to participate in multiple meetings over a period of months or
years."
3. Professional Neutral
Public Involvement: Not necessary
Consensus Building: "... more often relies on the services of a professional neutral who
can help identify representatives of stakeholder groups, facilitate meetings, and mediate
among diverse parties in both face-to-face meetings as well as in individual caucuses."
3s Consensus Building Institute, Partnering, Consensus Building, and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Current
Uses and Opportunities in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Cambridge, 1995
The first definition has gone too far to narrow the definition of public involvement.
Although many public involvement efforts might be used for gathering information from
the public, that is not necessarily the case.
The second orientation needs some additional comments. Anyone who wants to
participate in the consensus-building forums should be allowed to do so, but the
professional neutral can try to adjoin him/her to an existing group that has been in the
forum. Otherwise, limitation of entry contradicts with the concept of the consensual
approach. In sum, a professional neutral actively identifies and invites stakeholders, but
anyone still can participate in the forum.
The third definition is quite clear. The existence of professional neutral is crucial in
consensus building efforts, although public involvement does not necessarily call for
him/her. Considering that the consensus building is a form of assisted negotiation, the
importance of a neutral is natural.
Susskind also draws a line between consensus building and citizen involvement. In
the article, he focuses on the role of planner, as he puts:
The traditional approaches to citizen involvement presume that the land use planner is a
technician working for a public agency or elected official. Consensus building puts the
land use planner into a role much like that of the chairman of the task force, whose job it
was to structure a bargaining process and mediate. 36
The common feature in both CBI's report and Susskind's article is the importance of
neutrals in facilitating the dialogue between stakeholders. Such neutrals work as
moderator or facilitator to manage the consensus building effort. However, some literature
about public involvement also discuss the uses of professional neutrals. Federal Highway
Administration summarizes techniques for public involvement used for highway planning,
36 Susskind, Op. Cit., 1977
and facilitation and mediation are among the list.37 It is not that public involvement does
not utilize any neutral person.
Therefore, the difference between consensus building and public involvement can be
defined as follows: Consensus building requires a neutral to manage the effort, while such
a person is optional in public involvement effort.
Theoretical Obstacles to Using the Consensual Approach
Although I have discussed the advantages of the consensual approach over the
conventional process, there are some conditions that preclude or impede the application of
the consensual approach. Theoretically, there are three fundamental obstacles to the use of
the consensual approach:
1) Strong BATNA
When planning authorities perceive that the conventional process without
collaborative negotiations will achieve better outcomes than the consensual approach, they
will certainly choose to pursue the conventional process. For example, absolute dictators
trying to relocate native tribes would not negotiate because they don't fear their substantial
oppositions. In the same way, public officials will not negotiate if they believe that their
proposals are the best possible solution and no one has leverages to challenge them. In
such cases, their BATNAs -unilateral actions- might be better than any possible
outcomes through negotiation. When a party does not need a consensus with other parties,
the consensual approach might not be taken seriously by the party as an alternative to the
conventional process.
3 Federal Highway Administration, Public Involvement Techniques for Transportation Decision-Making,
Washington DC, 1996, pp. 151-162
2) Misperception of BATNA
However, their evaluation of BATNAs might not be correct. Courts might order
injunction of administrative decisions. Opponents to unilateral decisions by officials can
attack them through politics and media. They can also physically disrupt their
implementation. Even in situations where the consensual approach has a possibility of
improving their decisions, officials are unlikely to use it when they don't consider the
effects of these actions because they miscalculated their BATNAs.
3) Misperception of efficient frontier/sticking to position
In addition, the assumption that the officials' decisions are the best solutions might
not be correct. How can they be confident that their decisions are better than any
negotiated outcome without negotiation? However, when the officials believe that their
decisions are the best possible solutions, they won't use the consensual approach because it
will not add any value to their decisions. They might also reject the approach to avoid
risking their position that the original decisions are the best. Officials' misperception
about possible negotiated outcomes -efficiency frontier- can impede the use of the
consensual approach.
Practical Obstacles to Using the Consensual Approach
These theoretical obstacles can be interpreted in more practical terms. There are
also some additional problems arising from the current structure of administrative
procedures. Public officials can be reluctant to use the consensual approach because of
the following reasons:
1) No Legal Mandate
If legal precedents assure that officials do not have legal mandate to reach a consensus
with protesting parties, they might find no benefit in using the approach. In other words,
officials might not consider the consensual approach when they do not fear that litigation in
the future might reject their unilateral decisions.
2) No Cost of Delay
Even if officials are free from litigation, they might worry that the implementation of
their decisions can be obstructed by their opponents. For example, opponents to
infrastructure development projects often prevent officials and construction workers from
entering the project sites. Such disruptions can delay the implementation and lead to
higher costs. However, if officials do not have to worry about such costs, they might stick
to the conventional approach.
3) No Political Interference
Elected officials or members of legislatures may request project managers to ease
protests against projects because of their campaign pledge or coming elections. However,
if officials are free from such political pressures, they might not change their way of making
decisions.
4) No Public Involvement/Participation Requirements
As a part of planning process, public involvement/participation is often required by
laws. The level of participation may vary, but officials have to face angry public if their
proposals are controversial. However, there are still many public decisions that do not
require any public involvement/participation. Some officials might not consider the
consensual approach seriously when interactions with public are not required.
5) Official's Fear Losing Decision-Making Authority
Although consensus building ensures that officials will retain their authority, they
might fear losing it. If they believe that their decision should be the best based on their
expertise, they might feel that their authority or dignity is threatened because the consensual
approach requires joint fact finding by all parties.
6) Problems Finding a Qualified Mediator
Even if officials are inclined to use the consensual approach, it is simply impossible if
they can't find professional neutrals to assist their efforts. Some officials might find
difficulties in finding a mediator if they don't know whom to contact at all. There might
not be trained neutrals in the region where the officials' jurisdiction. These troubles might
discourage officials from using the approach.
7) Very Little Experience with Mediation
Officials might have trouble in understanding the consensus building/mediation
process without hands-on experiences. They might reject the consensual approach based
on misunderstandings.
8) No Promise of Definitiveness
The consensual approach does not promise officials to reach an agreement with all
stakeholders. Officials might be unwilling to invest their time in the process that might
end in vain. Even though the conventional process will not produce better outcomes, it
can be completed according to their schedule.
Chapter 2
Highway Planning Process
in the United States and Japan
Highway Planning in the United States
Early Days to the Emergence of Interstate Highway Program
The history of modem highway planning in the United States dates back to 1916,
when the Bureau of Public Works was founded. The bureau later became the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) when the federal government organized the Department
of Transportation (DoT) in 1962. In 1921, the first Federal Highway Act was authorized
It launched federally aided highway programs. 38
However, the enactment of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 was actually the
beginning of the highway era of the United States. The act, authorized under the
Eisenhower administration, introduced "Interstate and Defense Highway" projects. The
overall project involved 41,000 miles of national highway networks at an estimated cost of
$27 billion at that time39 . The interstate highways were planned as freeway, although
there was a debate over the funding sources. Its companion, Highway Revenue Act
created the Highway Trust Fund, and federal tax revenues related to automobile operation,
such as gas taxes, were to be transferred to the fund. The fund was to be used solely for
highway construction and maintenance purposes, and thus the act earmarked the tax
revenues for highway programs. This was the first time in the history of the US congress
to authorize designation of tax revenue for a specific purpose (although the fund later
became available for mass transit projects)".
Around this time, pro-highway lobby was one of the two or three most powerful
lobbies in American politics. Altshuler et al.4 1 indicates seven reasons:
38 Weiner, E., Urban Transportation Planning in the United States, Praeger, New York, 1987, p. 2
39 Meyer, J., Autos, Transit, and Cities, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1981, p.7
40 Weiner, Op. Cit.
41 Altshuler, A., Womack, J., and Pucher, J., The Urban Transportation System: Politics and Policy
Innovation, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 28-31
1. It represented a large sector of the American economy:
Roughly one-six of all American businesses were involved in auto industries.
2. It had geographical distribution:
These businesses and workers were evenly distributed geographically.
3. It had leadership:
The supporters were the nation's largest companies.
4. It was equipped to forge strong ties between its national and local components:
Other business sectors had huge financial stakes with auto industries.
5. It included organized labor:
Union workers in auto industries also had a stake in highway development
6. It had money:
The oil and auto industries, contractors, and dealers assisted.
7. It had a receptive popular audience.
Highways are publicly associated with economic development, not with
environmental degradation.
At the time when the Interstate Highway project emerged, people in general were not
concerned, or not sure about the environmental problems it might evoke in the future.
Highway was a part of the American dream that people envisioned.
The Emergence of 3C Process
The earliest trace of public input provision in highway planning is found in 1962
Federal Highway Act. The Section 9 of the act stipulates that:
After July 1, 1965, the Secretary shall not approve under section 105 of this title any
programs for projects in any urban area of more than fifty thousand population unless he
finds that such projects are based on a continuing, comprehensive transportation planning
process carried out cooperatively by states and local communities in conformance with
the objectives stated in this section. 42
42 Weiner, Op. Cit., p. 19
This provision is called 3C process, abbreviating three key words: continuing,
comprehensive, and cooperative. However, at the time it was enacted, this 3C provision
did not include inputs from public in general as a part of the process. In Institutional
Memorandum 50-2-63, " "Cooperative" was defined to include not only cooperation
between the federal, state, and local levels of government but also among the various
agencies within the same level of government." 43
To facilitate the coordination between departments, agencies, and local governments,
the Bureau of the Budget issued Circular A-95 in 1969. This circular required state
governors to designate a regional agency or council to review and comment on federally
funded projects. So called A-95 organizations were usually comprised of elected officials
of local governments, planning departments, sub-regional or regional agencies, civil rights
agencies, and environmental control agencies." There was no requirement for direct input
from citizen, but it could be a leverage for interested citizens by influencing the elected
board members.
The first requirement of direct public participation in the highway planning process
emerged in 1968. The Federal Highway Aid Act of 1968 required one public hearing "on
the economic, social, and environmental effects of proposed highway projects." This was
the first public input requirement in the federal highway planning procedure. This hearing
requirement was expanded in the early 1969. FHWA revised Policy and Procedure
Memorandum 20-8, and required two public hearings that are "corridor public hearing," and
"highway design public hearing." However, the two hearing process "did not provide
adequate opportunity for citizen involvement and, worse, provided a difficult atmosphere
for dialogue."45
4 Weiner, Op. Cit., p. 20
44 National Wildlife Federation, The End of the Road: A Citizen's Guide to Transportation Problemsolving,
Wasington DC, 1977, p.8 8
4s Weiner, Op. Cit., pp. 38, 39
Later in the same year, the 3C process was revised to require public participation in
all phases in the planning process. This revision later became a basis for the more
extensive public involvement programs implemented in the mid-1970s.
NEPA and CAA - An leverage to stop highway project -
In 1970, the National Environmental Policy Act was enacted. It ordered every
federal agencies to take efforts to preserve the environment. In addition to declaring the
position of considering environmental impacts of federal actions, it requested
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) for major projects. Figure 2-1 and 2-2 is a
general description of the current process. When a project is found to create major
impacts on the surrounding environment, the responsible agencies should prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
However, the EIA process itself stopped few project based on the impacts found in
the process. Instead, environmentalists and citizens concerned with infrastructure projects
used the EIA process, in conjunction with Administrative Procedure Act and Freedom of
Information Act, as a leverage to stop the projects. Between 1970 and 1975, 6946 EISs
were prepared by the federal agencies , and 654 of them were brought to courts DoT
prepared 3049 EISs, and 172 were litigated.
Courts ordered injunctions based on failures in EIA process or EISs. For example,
Daly v. Volpe rejected an EIS for interstate highway 90 project in Washington because it
did not discuss the impacts of the project location properly.46 It ordered the Department of
Highways to prepare an EIS again, and also ordered an injunction against the project (this
dispute was finally resolved by mediation).47 Courts sometimes went further to reject EISs
4 6 Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252, 1972
47 In 1976, the Office of Mediaiton at the University of Washington became involved in the dispute, and
parties reached an agreement that year. See, Patton, L. and Cormick, G., Op. Cit.
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based on their contents. However, "the significance of the courts' enforcement of NEPA
has diminished as a result of decisions made by the U.S. Supreme Court during the Reagan
and Bush administrations." 50
The Clean Air Act Amendments (CAA) of 1970 were also a huge step toward the
environmental protection. The act created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
and requested its administrators to set ambient standards of air quality and to ensure its
achievement by mid-1975. 51 The act also requested each state to prepare state
implementation plans (SIP) to meet the standards. When it was found to be difficult to
realize the plan only by controlling stationary source, states had to create transportation
control plan (TCP).
Interpretations of the enforcement of the CAA by the courts were so strict that some
civil suits led EPA to change its actions. In Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, the supreme court
reversed a grant by EPA to extend the implementation of TCP for two years, which was the
maximum permitted by the act.
However, the actual enforcement of the TCPs were frustrated by the counter-actions
by the Congress and states. Some disincentives to use private automobiles, such as
parking surcharges, were banned by the Congress.
CAA itself could not be used as a measure to stop a particular highway project,
because the SIP and TCP were concerned only with the overall quality of air. However, it
assisted the anti-highway groups by demanding the enforcement of the strict standards.
Moratorium in Boston
Around mid-1960s, urban residents and environmentalists began protests against the
52
social and physical destructiveness of the Interstate Highway projects. Massachusetts
50 Ortolano, Op. Cit., p.324
51 Altshuler et al, Op. Cit., p. 184
52 Rose, M., Interstate: express highway politics, 1939-1989, University of Tennessee Press, 1990, pp. 101-
108
governor Sergent's moratorium on new highway construction marked one of the greater
success of highway revolt. This was the first time in the United States that so many major
projects in a region were canceled due to oppositions from public. It led to the first
comprehensive public participation effort in highway planning.
In the post war Boston, "housing was overcrowded, and much of it was old and
substandard."5 3 The concept of urban renewal pervaded through the area in which
highway development would take an important role. The Department of Public Works
originally created a highway plan of the Greater Boston area in 1948. In the mid 1950s, it
started to include the uncompleted projects of the plan into the federally funded interstate
project, which would substantially ease its financial burden.
By the mid 60s, Route 128, Central Artery, South East Expressway, North East
Expressway, and Massachusetts Turnpike had been built. These projects were faced with
some oppositions, but they were not enough to obstruct the implementation of these
projects.54 There were four major projects remaining to be implemented: the South East
Expressway (1-95), Inner Belt (1-695), 1-95 North, and Route 2 Extension.
In the early 1960s, citizens of Cambridge, mobilized by its politicians, began a protest
against the Inner Belt project, which would relocate about 1,500 homes in the area.
Cambridge is a home to Harvard University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT), and professionals of planning and architecture in these institutions were connected
s3 Sloan, A., Citizen Participation in Transportation Planning: The Boston Experience, Ballinger, Cambridge,
MA, 1974, p. 1 1
54 Sloan, Op. Cit., p..20-21
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Figure 2-3: Highway Projects in Boston before the Moratorium 5
- Most of these plans were canceled -
with local community groups. In due course, these professionals joined and assisted the
communities, and succeeded in delaying the implementation.56
In 1966, demolition for the Southeast Expressway started in Jamaica Plain and
Roxbury. Local residents began protests here too. By the time, the highway projects
were attacked by anti-highway leaders like James Morey, Justin Gray, Frederick Salvucci,
and John Culp 5 7. Their arguments were that 1) the projects would destroy neighborhoods,
2) they used faulty methods. 58 In the next year, the Urban Planning Aid organized the
Greater Boston Committee on the Transportation Crisis. This was a coalition of the activists
and communities fighting against the Inner Belt, Southeast Expressway, and 1-95 North
with assistance of the professionals at MIT and Harvard. It conducted independent studies
and criticized the projects.
Later, the movement became more political rather than the technical investigations.
In 1969, the GBC launched a series of demonstrations requesting a review of the projects by
a task force. In August, newly appointed governor Sergent accepted the idea of the task
force which was chaired by Alan Altshuler of MIT. The task force held meetings with
community groups and government officials, each of them protesting and supporting the
highway projects. Early in 1970, the task force concluded that all these projects needed
restudy, following the meetings, although there was a question about the effectiveness of
the restudy in the late stage of planning. The task force firmly recommended a
moratorium to the governor, which would stop all the highway projects within 1-128.
Finally in February, he announced the moratorium, and ordered a restudy of the projects.59
The process was followed by Boston Transportation Planning Review (BTPR).
BTPR incorporated participatory process, and significantly altered the projects. Some of
them, like the Southwest corridor, transformed into public transit projects.
56 Gaston, M., Community Participation in Boston's Sowthwest Corridor Project: A Case Study, MCP Thesis,
MIT, 1981, pp.68-73
5 Sloan, Op. Cit., p.25
58 Sloan, Op. Cit., pp.25-26
Improved 3C Process - MPO and Guidebooks for officials-
The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1970 required more coordination between local
governments and state highway departments. The influence of local officials in highway
planning continued to grow.
Following the enactment of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1970, the FHWA
produced "Process Guidelines" in 1972 (23 CFR 795), based on discussions at a Highway
Research Board Workshop. These guidelines required each state to prepare an Action
Plan, and "the involvement of other agencies and the public" was also among the items to
be described in it.60
The Federal Highway Act was amended in 1973. It created Metropolitan Planning
Organizations (MPOs) to coordinate local land use plans and state highway plans.61
MPO-like organizations existed even in the 1950s, and the its number increased after the
3C process was required. Initially, the majority of MPOs were regional councils. 62
In 1975, FHWA and Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) jointly
issued regulations requiring MPOs to take a regional planning process as a condition of the
funds from federal government. According to the regulation, MPOs were required to
create a plan with long-range element and shorter-range "Transportation Systems
Management Element." Following these plans, they also have to create Transportation
Improvement Program, which should contain all highway and transit projects to be
implemented within the coming five years. These plans had to follow the 3C process, and
thus the inputs from the public was necessary.63
(continued)
59 Sloan, Op. Cit., pp. 28-2960 Weiner, Op. Cit., p.47
61 Weiner, Op. Cit., p. 49; Rosenbloom, S., "Transportation Planning," The Practice of Local Government
Planning, ICMA, Washington DC, 1988, p. 14 8
62 Association of Metropolitan Planning Organizations, "About MPOs," from AMPO web site
(http://www.narc.org/ampo/)
63 Weiner, Op. Cit., pp. 54-55
The FHWA produced a
guidebook called "Effective
Citizen Participation in
Transportation Planning" in
1976.64 This guidebook has two
volumes. Volume I: Community
Involvement Processes gives
general explanation about the
participation and the planning Figure 2-4: Guidebooks Published by FWHA
process. It reasons that the
purposes of public participation are; 1) to see that the decisions of government reflect the
preferences of the people; and 2) that it helps create better plans, it increases the likelihood
of implementing the plan, and it generates support for the agency. It also reviews the
practice of transportation planning, and interestingly, admits that the planning is no longer
the exclusive province of professional planners. Volume II is a glossary of techniques,
and table 2-1 is the list of techniques described in it. Among the 37 techniques, two were
about the use of intermediaries: "Arbitrative and Mediative Planning" and "Coordinator or
Coordinator-Catalyst." Although their use is not considered indispensable, it is
noteworthy that the concept of mediation/consensus-building appeared more than twenty
years ago.
In 1977, FHWA also issued another guidebook: "Community Involvement in
Highway Planning and Design: A Manual of Techniques." 65 This manual was initially an
instructional manual for a FHWA-sponsored training course, "Community Involvement in
Highway Planning and Design, Phase II." Its predecessor, Phase I, was conducted from
" Federal Highway Administration, Effective Citizen Participation in Transportation Planning, Washington
DC, 1976
65 Federal Highway Administration, A Manual of Community Involvement Techniques for Designing and
Implementing Community Involvement in Highway Planning and Design, Washington DC, 1977
October 1973 to May 1974, and the course was called "Synergy," taken from the name of
the firm which developed and conducted the course. The Synergy approach was composed
of four concepts: 1) Active Listening, 2) Congruent Sending, 3) The Facilitator Role, and 4)
The Recorder Role. It is amazing that the concept of facilitation with a recorder was
applied to the highway planning in the 1970s, although the manual assumes public officials
to take the facilitator's role. "Employing a Coordinator or Coordinator-Catalyst," which
basically refers to a professional facilitator, is still one of the sixty techniques in the manual.
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991
In 1991, the Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
(ISTEA). This act was considered to be a big change in the history of highway planning
process partly because it required "public involvement" in highway planning. 23 CFR
450.212(a) (see appendix) declares "public involvement processes shall be proactive and
provide complete information, timely public notice, full public access to key decisions, and
opportunities for early and continuing involvement." 66 Compared to the previous public
hearing requirements and the rather abstract 3C requirements, ISTEA process has
incorporated an additional requirement of "demonstrating explicit consideration and
response to public input during the planning and program development process,"67 which
means that sponsors of the process have an obligation to respond to the opinions expressed
by the public.
ISTEA process has three major components: the long-range plan, the Transportation
Improvement Program (TIP), and Major Investment Study (MIS). Each state and MPO are
required to prepare the long-range plans and TIPs. In all of the three processes, MPO or
other responsible organization is obliged to take public involvement efforts.
66 23 CFR 450.212(a)
67 23 CFR 450.212(a)(5)
Long range plan
The long range plan should encompass transportation projects for the coming 20 years.
The plan should at least 1) define the goals and objectives; 2) analyze existing conditions;
3) assess transportation needs; 4) consider socioeconomic and travel demand projections; 5)
evaluate alternatives; 6) examine the impacts; 7) define project scopes and design concepts:
and 8) include a financial plan. 6 8 Thus, this is a rather general plan visioning the future
developments, but "any subsequent capital projects funded through the TIP process must be
consistent with the goals, policies and priorities set in the long range plan.'' 69
ISTEA does not stipulate specific requirements on the way to conduct public involvement
in planning a long-range plan, but the general public involvement requirement applies.
Thus the responsible organization should facilitate some mechanisms to seek public review,
and respond to the comments in the final draft of the plan. If a MPO is in an area
classified as a nonattainment area by Clean Air Acts Amendments of 1990 (CAAA), the
comment period in this process should be at least 30 days.70
Transportation Improvement Program (TIP)
TIP is a shorter-range plan. It must include: 1) all projects to be funded with federal
transportation funds during the 3-year period of the TIP; 2) only projects that are consistent
with the regional transportation plan; and 3) all regionally significant projects proposed for
implementation during the timeframe of the TIP. It should be updated at least biennially.
Again, ISTEA does not stipulate any public involvement requirement during the TIP
process. In case a MPO is in an area classified as a nonattainment area, one formal public
68 Central Transporation Planning Staff (CTPS), The 1997 Transporation Plan for the Boston Region, pp. ES-
1-3
69 Younger, K., "Public Involvement," ISTEA Planners Workbook Ed. Franko M., Surface Transporation
Policy Project
70 23 CFR 450.316(b) (1)-(iv)
71 CTPS, Transporation Improvement Program and Air Quality Conformity Determination FY 1998-2003,
pp.3-1, 3-2
meeting should be annually held during TIP development process, and the comment period
should be at least 30 days.
Highway Planning in Japan
Overview of the Highway System
Japan had been without any highway until 1958. In 1957, the National Highway Act
(Kosoku-Kokudo-Jidousha-Ho) and the National Development Linkage Highway
Construction Act (Kokudo-Kaihatu-kansen-Jidoshado-Kensetsu-Ho) were enacted. The
next year, the first highway in Japan, Meishin-Kosoku-Doro, was built between Ritto and
Amagasaki, which extended for 44 miles. Since then, the Japanese highway system has
kept on growing as the country prospered economically (See Figure 2-5). In 1969,
Toumei-Kousoku-Doro project was completed, and Tokyo and Osaka, the first and second
largest city, was then connected by the highway system. At the end of 1996, the total
length of Japanese highway system was about 3,800 miles (See Figure 2-6).
Except for intra-city highways, Japanese highway system is developed by the Road
Bureau in the Ministry of Construction (MoC), and operated by Japan Highway Public
Company (JH).7 The system basically has two types of highway: National Development
Arterial Highway (NDAH: Kokudo-Kaihatsu-Kansen-Jidousha-Do) and National Road
Exclusive for Automobiles (NREA: Ippan-Kokudo-Jidousha-Senyou-Douro).'4 Currently,
most of the existing and planned highways are NAH.
The budget for all types of road, not only for highways, is earmarked. At the
national level, all the Volatile Oil Tax and half of the Gas Tax should be used for road
developments, which are stipulated by acts. At the prefectural level, Diesel Gas Tax and
Automobile Acquisition Tax are also earmarked for the prefectural road development
budgets.75
72 Ministry of Construction, Road Bureau, Douro-Gyosei (Road Administration), 1997, pp. 279-306
3 Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, and Fukuoka have intra-city highways. They are built by these city governments,
and operated by separate authorities.
74 There are many other categories of highways, but they are too complicated to explain here.
7 MoC, Op. Cit., p. 75
Figure 2-5: High-Level Arterial Road Network Plan76
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7 MoC, Op. Cit., p. 288
Toll from the highway users is also an exclusive source of the budget. At the outset, the
highway system was planned to become free. However JH currently collects toll for all
the highways. The initial plan was to collect toll and use the revenue to develop additional
highways until the development of the national highway system finishes, which is called
"Toll-Pooling System." However, the development has not yet completed, and thus all the
highways are now toll road.
In the 40 years of highway development, its planning process has not changed almost
at all. Thus, I will not look at the history of highway planning process in Japan, but each
component of the process.
Highway Planning at the National Level
National Planning
All highway projects first appears in the High-Level Arterial Road Network Plan
(Koukikaku-Kansen-Douro-Mou-Keikaku). This plan is created solely by MoC, and then
its Road Council authorizes. The latest plan was decided in 1987, and the total length of
the planned network was 8,700 miles. It only indicated the origin and destination of the
highways.
NDAH projects, which consists a major part of the highway projects, are described in
the National Development Arterial Highway Construction Act of 1987 (Kokudo-Kaihatsu-
Kansen-Jidousha-Do-Kensetu-Ho). This means that the NDAH projects were authorized
by the national diet. The act has a list of highways that should be developed in Japan, and
the total length is 7,160 miles. The list includes both implemented and planned highways,
and 3,686 miles of them had been built at the end of 1995.78 This act also only defines the
origin, destination, and major cities on the route of the highways.
Other highway projects, including NAER, appear in the National General
Development Plans (NGDP: Zenkoku-Sougou-Kaihatsu-Keikaku). The plan is formally
created by the Prime Minister, but the actual planning is done by the National Land Council
(NLC: Kokudo-Shingikai). The membership of NLC is by the appointment of Prime
Minister. It is composed of university professors in the relevant fields, leaders of national
organizations, and CEOs of major Japanese companies. In this plan, highway projects are
listed only with their origin and destination.
Then, the Road Council creates Five-Year Road Development Plan. The plan
stipulates the road development projects to be implemented in the coming five years, but
this one also does not refer to specification of the projects.79 Instead, it just indicates the
origin and destination. However, the most updated plan indicated the need of solicitation
of public view through "public involvement" processes. The council conducted a national
survey of public opinion about the road development policy in general.
Before planning the details, the MoC should prepare Basic Plans (Kihon-Keikaku).
The issuance of Basic Plans indicates that the project will be soon implemented, but again,
these plans are fairly general without any site-specific information. In case of the NDAH
projects, they need to be approved by the NDAH Construction Council.
These national plans only indicate a general picture of the highway network system,
and does not indicate exactly when and how each project will be implemented. Therefore,
few controversy about specific highway projects become apparent, and the legitimacy of
these plans has rarely been attacked.
Urban Planning8 0
Before implementations of highway projects, the Urban Planning process is held at
the local level. The Urban Planning Act of 1968 (Toshi-Keikaku-Ho) requires all
(continued)
78 MoC, Op. Cit., p. 282
79 Interview with Prof. S. Morichi
8 0 Matsuura, M., Toshi-Keikaku-Kettei-Tetsuzuki-no-Kaizen-Hosaku-ni-Kansuru-Kenkyu, B. Eng. Thesis,
University of Tokyo, Dept. of Civil Eng., 1996
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prefectures and municipal governments (cities/towns/villages) within Urbanized Area to
have Urban Plans. The major components of prefectural Urban Plans are the boundaries
between Urbanized Area and Urbanization Adjustment Area and major infrastructure
projects. Those of municipal governments are the local zoning ordinances,81 major
infrastructure projects, and community plans. Highway projects are of course considered
to be major projects, and thus they should be amended to both of these Urban Plans.
The Urban Planning Act was amended in 1985, and required all the municipalities to
prepare Local Master Plans (Sichoson-Master-Plan). All subsequent Urban Plans should
be in accord with the goals set in their Local Master Plans.
Information Meetings
First, the Urban Planning process by the municipalities is held. Urban Plan
proposals should be created by the municipal governments taking some measures to reflect
the concerns of residents, like public hearings. However, the governments have to take
such measures only when the governments find a necessity to do so. In general,
81 In Japanese law, zoning ordinance is not authorized by local legislatures. Planning divisions of local
information meetings (setsumei-kai) are held, but formal public hearings (kocho-kai) are
rarely held. In many cases, the sponsors of the projects, in cooperation with the
municipalities, prepares a detailed plan, and proposes it in the information meetings. The
last part of each information meeting is usually devoted to a "questions and answers
(shitsugi-outo)" session. In the session, participants of the meeting are supposed to raise
questions about the proposed plan, and the sponsor of the project answers to it. However,
what is often seen in these meetings for controversial projects is the proponents
demonstrating their opposition to the project, and the authorities making ambiguous
comments. Anyway, the local governments have a discretion whether to "reflect" the
opinions and concerns discussed in the formal proposal.
Announcement
After these meetings, the municipal governments should formally announce a
proposal to amend the projects to their Urban Plan. The proposal should be reviewed by
public, and anyone can send comments to the municipal government within two-week
review period. The announcement does not have to be made through newspapers or local
media.
Governor's Authorization
Then, the prefectural governor should formally authorize the proposal. Before the
authorization, the governor refer it to the Prefectural Urban Planning Council which is
described later. The council receives the summary of the public comments created by the
local governments.
(continued)
governments create draft amendments, and authorized through Urban Planning process.
Local Urban Planning Council
A circular of Vice-Minister of Construction requests municipal governments to
organize Local Urban Planning Councils to consult planning issues. The council members
are appointed by mayors, and they usually involves aldermen/women, leaders of
organizations within its jurisdiction, selectmen/women, and university professors.
Usually, the council reviews the proposal, and gives authorization, although this
council does not have any legal veto power. In the review process, the local government
submit the summary of comments. In some cases, proponents of the project are allowed to
make presentations in the council meetings.
Formal Announcement and Decisions
After the council grant the proposal, the local governments formally announce the
amendment of the project. There is no need for authorization by local legislature.
Prefectural Urban Planning Process
Highway projects have to be amended in the Prefectural Urban Plan. Generally,
after all municipal governments affected by the projects amended them, the prefectural
process starts. The process is almost same as that of local government, and the major
difference is the Prefectural Urban Planning Council. The Urban Planning Act requires all
the prefectural government to organize the council to formally authorize the amendments.
The members of the council are appointed by the governor, and they are usually mayors,
leaders of prefectural organizations, selectmen/women, and university professors
The summary of comments are generated by the prefectural government, and should
be submitted to the council meetings. Failure to do so can lead to the enjoinment of the
amendment. For example, a court rejected an amendment because of the insufficient
information supplied to the council meeting.
MoC's report argues that council should be closed to the public, although another
report suggests to use the council to listen to the opinion of the residents.82 Some records
show such presentations have been allowed in some cases. Council occasionally suggests
"additional opinions" to the proposal, especially when oppositions are outstanding.
However, the MoC argues that the governments should respect such opinions, although do
not have to change the plan.
Environmental Impact Assessment
The National Environmental Impact Assessment Act was enacted in 1997 and has not
yet been applied widely. Its predecessor, the environmental impact assessments guidelines
in the Executive Order of Prime-Minister have been applied to the national projects for
more than a decade. In addition, prefectural governments have developed their own EIA
process since 1973. In 1995, 50 of 57 prefectures and quasi-prefectural city governments
had their own processes. 83 In this section, the local EIA processes will be discussed. The
processes are defined in their local ordinances or guidelines. The projects which need to
go through the EIA process are described in the ordinances and guidelines, and their target
is usually more wider than the national guideline. These local EIA processes are
somewhat different reflecting local environmental issues, but most of them follow a basic
three-step format.
Preliminary Environmental Impact Statement
Before starting the EIA process, the sponsor of the project or the local government prepares
an Preliminary Environmental Impact Statement (Pre-EIS: Kankyo-Eikyo-Hyoka-Junbisho).
Local ordinances stipulates the issues to be described in the Pre-EIS according to the nature
82 Ministry of Construction, City Bureau, Toshi-Keikaku-Ho-no-Unyo, Gyosei, Tokyo, 1995, pp. 649-650
83 Kurai, K., "Chiho-Kokyo-Dantai-no-Kankyo-Eikyo-Hyoka-Seido-no-Genjo," Kankyo, August 1996,
Environmental Agency, pp. 18-20
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of the projects. If the Pre-EIS is prepared by the sponsor of the project, the prefectural
governments request them to submit researches plans for the Pre-EIS .84 The Pre-EIS are
publicized for several weeks for public reviews and comments.
Information Meetings for Pre-EIS
Information meetings, like the Urban Planning process, are held after the Pre-EIA was
publicized. This meeting is sometimes conducted at a same time with the information
meeting of Urban Planning process.
Final Environmental Impact Statement
After the public review and comment process, the sponsor of the process publish
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS: Kankyo-Eikyo-Hyouka-Sho). The summary of
public comments to the Pre-EIS and the responses to the comments should be included in
the EIS.
84 Supra p.19
Comparision of the Processes
Is there any significant difference in the highway planning processes between the
United States and Japan? What are the major obstacles to using the consensual approach
in each process? What stimulated the development of the consensual approach in the
United States and what will be the major obstacles in Japan?
I identified how public officials in each country will find the eight obstacles discussed
in Chapter 1, and Table 2-1 is the summary. If an obstacle is "high," it is likely to impede
the use of the consensual approach, and vice versa.
By comparing the significance of incentives/obstacles in the US and Japan, three
major differences are found. These differences - no legal mandate, no political
interference, and difficulties in finding qualified mediators- have impeded and will be
obstacles to the application of the consensual approach in highway planning in Japan.
No Legal Mandate
Since the enactment of NEPA, many highway projects are brought to court with
charges against failures in their EISs. Highway officials responded to these litigation by
preparing massive EISs so that they would not miss any information that could be deemed
necessary by courts. However, these court battles were everlasting. Environmentalists
refined their strategies to fight in courts to stop highway projects. They also mobilized
legislatures to enact environmental legislation to gain more power through the court battles.
In Japan, the Urban Planning Act stipulates that the local governments should take
some measures to reflect public opinion into their draft amendment plan "if the officials
find its necessity." The clauses allowing discretion of officials precludes lawsuits against
the official decisions. Usually, appeals against Urban Plan are rejected based on 1) lack of
standing as plaintiffs; and 2) immaturity. The Administrative Litigation Act permits only
those who will legally benefit from requesting a rejection of administrative decisions
Table 2-1: Obstacles to using the consensual approach
in the United States and Japan
No legal mandate
I
us
L
No cost of delay
No political
interference
Public
involvement/
participation
requirements
Officials' fear to
lose decision-
making authority
Difficulties in
finding qualified
mediators
L
L
ISTEA does not require a
consensus, but opponents can
litigate EISs and other plans.
It depends on the emergency of
projects.
Newly elected officials or
referendums can change whole
process.
ISTEA requires public
involvement, but officials have
discretion.
At the project level, they may
fear that the project would
completely be stopped.
Mediation firms exist. State
offices of dispute resolution can
assist.
Very little Mediation is becoming popular,
experience of but many officials do not have
mediation experiences.
No promise of Still not definitive, but many
definitiveness successful precedents exist.
H: high, M: medium, L: low
JAPAN
Courts rarely order injunctions
based on failures in Urban Plans
and EISs
It depends on the emergency of
projects.
Politics have few influence on
the process [but interfere with
the substance].
The Urban Planning Act requires
public participation for each
project, but officials have
discretion.
At the project level, local
officials may fear strongly.
No professional
mediator/facilitator exists.
Almost no informal mediation
effort in highway planning.
Officials may feel high risks
because no precedent exists.
to become a plaintiff. In cases related to the Urban Planning Act, this condition precludes
those who do not have any title in project sites and rejects their standing as plaintiffs.
Courts also rejected some appeals because they were not substantial, which is called the
immaturity case. For example, a zoning ordinance is considered to be immature. Judges
advised plaintiffs to bring their cases again when they are actually forced to obey the
ordinance.
The absence of legal mandates allows officials in Japan to make decision without a
fear of losing litigation in the future. They might not be interested in forestalling possible
lawsuits through the consensual approach because they will not lose anyway.
No Political Interference
The history of highway planning in the United States indicates that the planning
process has been highly influenced by the politics. For long-range plans, the moratorium
in Boston was one of the epoch-making event. Public opposition against intra-city
highway projects developed into a political pressure to start an extensive restudy of these
projects. The newly elected governor Sergent finally announced the moratorium. It was
followed by BTPR in which the long-range transportation plan of the Boston area was
reconfigured through public participation process. The recent consensus building effort in
creating Maine Transportation Plan was initiated by a state referendum.85 These examples
show that the political pressures have nourished reforms in highway planning process.
In the United States, project-specific plans can also be influenced by politics because
the localities have organizations administering their land use, such as planning boards.
Their members are usually elected. Thus, local politics can affect the decisions made by
higher authorities, and politicians can inject themselves into the decision-making process at
the higher level.
85 Reitman, I. and Gosline, A., "Maine's road from referendum to reform," Consensus, April 1994, MIT-
Harvard Public Disputes Program
On the contrary, Japanese politics rarely affects the highway planning process, while
their intervention into substances of the plans seems to be prevalent. A few years ago,
there was a debate over a construction of river dam in Japan. The Minister of
Construction then was a member of the Social Democratic Party, which claimed for more
public participation in infrastructure decision-makings. He implied a temporary
suspension of the project reflecting the national concern about its environmental impacts.
However, he finally authorized the project with a comment; "Ministry of Construction
cannot be stopped." There have not been such an example in the realm of highway
planning, but this example shows how politics are poor in reforming the process in Japan.
Local politics are also poor in intervening the highway planning process. They seem
to have informal paths to negotiate with national governments, and such negotiations
behind public eyes are called Nemawashi in Japanese. Thus, local politicians do not have
an incentive to increase the chance of public participation.
These poor performance of Japanese politics in pressuring the officials resulted in the
perpetuation of the conventional process. In other words, they could be more mobilized to
encourage the use of the consensual approach.
Difficulties in Finding Qualified Mediators
The thirty-year development of mediation in the public policy field in the United
States have created organizations encouraging the use of the consensual approach. Many
universities now institutionalized dispute resolution programs. Private mediation firms
and non-profit organizations provide mediation services to the public sector. Twenty
states have created state offices of dispute resolutions. Following the initial contacts from
the disputing parties, the offices typically initiate mediation efforts using their expertise and
commissioned mediators. They have roasters of professional neutrals who can help the
disputing parties.
These institutions reduce the problems offinding qualified mediators. For example,
the recent successful mediation of Route 2A dispute was made possible with assistant of
Massachusetts Office of Dispute Resolution.
Although mediation has been used for interpersonal disputes for long, informal
mediation for disputes over public policy is not common in Japan.86 A formal
environmental mediation procedure exists, but this is rather an appeal system than an
informal process. The mediators at the national level are lawyers and retired public
officials appointed by the national diet. Thus, there is almost no professional mediator or
facilitator available for informal mediation/consensus building effort using the consensual
approach. Considering mediation requires professional skills, the unavailableness of
professional neutrals in Japan is a big obstacle impeding the use of the consensual
approach.
86 Brown, D., "Divorce and Family Mediation," Conciliation Courts Review, Vol. 20, No. 2, Assoc. of Family
and Colciliation Courts, Beverly Hills, 1982
Chapter 3
Case Studies
Introduction
How can mediation and consensus building be used to resolve highway
disputes? How do officials manage the highway planning process in
Japan? What better outcomes might be achieved by using a consensual
approach to highway planning?
This chapter will discuss two cases of highway planning. One is a highway
widening project in the United States that used mediation after the project was rejected by
local officials. This case study will show how mediation works in an actual setting and- the
good outcomes it can help to achieve. The other is a highway construction project in
Japan. This case was basically decided using only the conventional approach to highway
planning, and the project is still being protested by local residents. This case study will
also be used to structure a thought experiment in the next chapter.
By comparing these two cases, I will try to show how the United States
experiences with mediation could be helpful in Japan.
Route 2A in Lexington, MA87
Overview
Route 2A, which is also called Marrett Road, in Lexington, Massachusetts is a
two-lane road starting from I-95/Route 128 and going west. On the both sides of the road,
there are woods and grassy plains. The view is attractive to nature-loving people. Route
2A is also the entrance to the Minute Man National Historic Park, where the natural
environment is well preserved.
There are a lot of curves and slopes on Route 2A due both to its old-fashioned
design and the typical hilly topography in New England. These add to the attractiveness of
the old winding road, but have caused many tragic accidents. Between 1991 and 1994,
there were 31 accidents on the road, including two fatalities. 8 Other statistics shows that
the number of accidents rose by 98 percent.89 During the same period, the level of traffic
increased only by 34 percent. Traffic congestion is another problem. The two-lane road
handles more than 144,000 vehicles daily.90  Every morning , it is jammed with commuters
driving into the central Boston area.
The Route 2A project included a plan to widen a section of the road between 1-95
and Massachusetts Avenue from three to five lanes. The section between 1-95 and the
entrance to the Historic Park would become a five-lane road with a center stacking lane for
turns. The plan also involved some relocation of connecting roads.
The Massachusetts Highway Department (MHD) planned the project for more than
12 years in collaboration with the town of Lexington. The actual design was completed by
the town in accordance with an agreement between MHD and the town. This project was
87 Information contained in this chapter draws much on case studies completed by Rachel Freed and Meighan
Matthews. I would like to thank them to give me a permission to use their efforts here.
88 Boston Globe, "Lexington panel fears state won't listen to its vote on Rte. 2A," August 7, 1994
89 Freed, R., The Road: A Case Study of the Marrett Road Mediation and Implementation Processes, Final
project at University of Massachusetts at Boston, p. 4
90 Boston Globe, "Critics fault plan to widen Route 2A," May 22, 1994
reviewed by the local Design Advisory Committee and the Route 2A Ad Hoc Committee. 9'
The most worrisome environmental impact of the project involved the disturbance
of 8,980 square feet of wetland.9 2 This wetland affects the water quality of a reservoir
serving the nearby city of Cambridge.
Initial Efforts toward Mediation
MHD received approval from the town's board of selectmen and also support from
the Federal Highway Administration in 1994. However, 2 out of 3 members of the
Lexington Conservation Commission (LCC) voted against the project. They were
concerned about environmental impacts, including aesthetic aspects of the proposed road
widening. MHD immediately appealed to the state Department of Environmental
Protection's (DEP) wetland division for a Superseding Order of Conditions. This gave
DEP control because it could override the LCC's rejection
After a site review, a DEP officer, Rachel Freed who had some experiences with
mediation suggested using mediation instead of continuing the adjudicatory process.93
She referred the case to the Massachusetts Office of Dispute Resolution (MoDR) with a
suggested list of possible participants. In March 1995, the initial convening effort was
taken by MoDR Program Coordinator, Meighan Matthews. MoDR invested 36 hours of
staff time over three months. Freed and Matthews worked together to identify the people
that should be involved in the mediation effort. Matthews also called the stakeholders to
explain the general outline of the proposed mediation process, including how payment
would be handled. She worked out a schedule for the first meeting. MHD was reluctant
to participate, but the MoDR director Freddie Kay called the department and persuaded
them to come. MoDR selected Brad Honoroff of The Mediation Group from its panel of
professional mediators, to assist the parties.
91 Boston Globe, Op. Cit., May 22, 1994
92 Freed, Op. Cit., p. 7
93 Freed, Op. Cit., pp. 8-11
Major Stakeholders
Board of Selectmen, Town of Lexington
They initially proposed the project design and wanted the project implemented as
designed. Town officials and engineers, other than LCC members, "(didn't) think there
(was) as much of an environmental threat as opponents postulated, and said the area (had) a
history of danger to drivers and pedestrians."94 Traffic congestion was also one of their
concerns.
Massachusetts Highway Department (MHD)
MHD had been working together with the town to solve the problems associated
with the roadway. They insisted that the project meet the state and federal standards, and
considered the initial proposal as the best option given the constraint.
Lexington Conservation Commission (LCC)
LCC rejected the proposal. From an environmental conservation perspective,
they were concerned about the size of wetland disturbance and other aesthetic issues. One
of its member said, "I would like to deny the plan as presented, personally, because I think
it's overkill. They are relocating road which destroys the area and cutting down hillsides
and trees and destroying wetlands." 95
National Park Service (NPS)
The section of Route 2A is an entrance to Minute Man National Park, and the Park
Service was concerned with the aesthetic aspect of the project: most of the park users must
drive through the section of Route 2A from 1-95. In addition, NPS found a habitat for
elderberry beetles, which is a rare species, and argued that the project should be reduced in
size to protect the threatened habitat.
94 Boston Globe, Op. Cit., August 7, 1994; from a comment of town officials and engineers
95 Boston Globe, Op. Cit., August 7, 1994; from a comment of Angera Frick, a member of LCC
City of Cambridge
The city of Cambridge had a reservoir next to the wetland, and the city was
concerned about the impacts on its water supply. In the previous year, Cambridge, LCC,
and MHD had a dispute over the maintenance of a MHD's garage nearby because the road
salt stored in the garage affected the water quality in the reservoir.96
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
DEP held the power to approve or reject the project. Freed, who suggested the
possibility of mediation, attended the meetings for DEP.97
Mediation Effort
The first meeting was held in June 28, 1995.98 About twenty representatives from
the six stakeholding groups participated. At the first meeting , they worked at an
Agreement to Mediate, including a set of ground rules. DEP indicated that it would accept
a mediated agreement as a basis for its decision as long as the parties would not appeal.99
No formal stakeholder analysis was prepared by the mediator.100
The participants explained their concerns and views about the project. At this
stage, the relationships among some of the parties seemed contentious. The town engineer
explained the initial proposal. To analyze the plan and alternatives, some of them decided
to hire engineers to help examine the project. The full group considered a three-lane
alternative, and all the parties found that the alternative would not be safe enough. Then,
they reframed their discussion from a polarized widen versus not-widen dispute to an
investigation of how to achieve better safety.101
After several meetings, the mediator strongly suggested forming small groups.
96 Boston Globe, September 12, Octover 3, and Novermber 21, 1993
97 Freed, Op. Cit.
98 Freed, Op. Cit., p. 14
99 Matthews, M., "Case Study: Route 2A/Lexington," MODR Report May 1996
100 Interview with Brad Honoroff
The parties created an Environmental Working Group. According to the interviews Freed
conducted, "most of them identified the small-group meetings as one of (the) most
productive and important parts of (the) mediation." 0 2 Before starting the small group
work, they agreed that all agreements would made by the full group meeting.
Traffic experts also met separately. The Park Service agreed with the
assumptions that the town engineer used. They proposed an alternative in these meetings,
but the subgroup reached the conclusion that the alternative was impractical in terms of its
environmental impacts.1 0 3
In the first meeting of the Environmental Working Group, MHD proposed a four-
lane alternative.104 This alternative needed to be worked out with NPS. With a request
from NPS, the mediator set up a meeting between NPS and MHD. In part, this meeting
helped to restore deteriorated relationships between these parties. They also began to
negotiate issues other than this project outside this mediation effort. Some town officials
in Lexington became upset when MHD dropped the five-lane proposal, but the mediator
assuaged their concern.105
In the full meeting after the environmental group internally reached an agreement,
all the parties basically accepted the four-lane option with an additional storm detention
area.106 Some further changes were made in their proposal. MHD and the town
proposed paving the shoulder of the road, but it was "resoundingly" rejected.107 They
finally agreed to use environmental-friendly materials to cover the shoulder of the road.
They also decided to organize a communication and implementation team to ensure that the
agreement would be observed afterwards.108
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'0' Freed, Op. Cit., pp. 27, 28
102 Freed, Op. Cit., p. 31
103 Freed, Op. Cit., p. 22-24
104 Freed, Op. Cit., p. 34
105 Interview with Brad Honoroff
106 Freed, Op. Cit., pp. 36-42
107 Freed, Op. Cit., pp. 36-37
108 Matthews, Op. Cit.
To address some issues that were not directly related to the project, other bilateral
agreements between the City of Cambridge and MHD, and the Park Service and MHD,
were also concluded. These side agreements satisfied their principal interests and
encouraged them to consent to the four-lane agreement. 109
DEP used the agreement as a basis of their permit and coordinated the
communication and implementation of the agreement.110  Some parties tried to renegotiate
and in this phase. One party is now dissatisfied with the way DEP handled its claims."'
However, no lawsuit has been filed, and all permits have been issued. At this moment, no
major construction work has began, but it is about to start. 1 2
109 Freed, Op. Cit., p.p. 42-45
"1 Matthews, Op. Cit.; Freed, Op. Cit., pp. 47-82
in Interview with a representative of LCC conducted by the Consensus Building Institute.
112 Interview with a representative of MHD
Yokohama Circular Highway Project South
Overview of the Project11 3
Yokohama Circular Highway Project South involves the construction of a national
highway connecting Yokohama-Yokosuka highway at Kanazawa, Yokohama, and Route 1
at Totsuka, Yokohama. The length of the proposed highway is 5.2 miles, and its use will
be limited to automobiles.
The proposed site is at the southern end of Yokohama City. Yokohama City is the
second largest city in the Kanto plains, with population of 3.34 million.
Existing routes around the proposed site have been suffering from traffic
congestion, and the highway was planned to alleviate it. It will be a part of a circular
bypass surrounding Yokohama City, which is called Yokohama Circular Highway (YCH).
Also, this section of YCH will be a part of Metropolitan Central Connection Highway
(MCCH), an outer bypass surrounding Tokyo Metropolitan Area.
Major conflict arose in two residential areas surrounded by hills. The highway
will be built underground through the residential areas. However, there is a small valley
dividing these areas, where the highway will cross the valley at grade. Another regional
road runs along the bottom of the valley. Thus, the highway will have to go over it by a
bridge with a short open-cut section.
In conjunction with this project, a community road (Kamigo-Kuden Line) will be
built though one of the residential areas.
113 Leaflets by MoC, Yokohama Road Construction Office
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CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW
Era of Residential Development 1 7
In the late 1970s, residential developments were planned around the proposed
highway site by private developers. The Yokohama City administration, at that time, had a
plan to build a road cutting through these developments. The city's plan was not based on
any formal decision. Thus, the administration was not sure whether the plan would be a
national highway project, or just a community road built by the city. The city did not have
formal authority to force the developers to change their original plans so that a site for the
potential road could be accommodated. It used Gyousei-Shido, a key administrative
tool.11 8  The city informally asked the developers to keep a strip of land undeveloped, and
116 MoC, Op. Cit., leaflet
117 Inteview with Togashi, A., Project manager of the YCH project at MoC, Yokohama Road Construction
Office
118 Gyosei-Shido is informal guidance to private parties without authoritative powers. However,
disobedience to it can implicitly lead to bad treatments by the authorities. Its legitimacy is debated in light of
T unnel
they agreed to do so.
A problem occurred when the developers started to sell individual lots. They
found that the lots could not sell if they told their customers that the strip of land might be a
site for a highway, so they kept this secret. The city government, not sure about how the
land would be used, could not do anything to stop them. There was no legal basis for
forcing Gyosei-Shido. New residents looking for a better environment away from Tokyo
were attracted. They did not know that the land would be developed into a highway.
Planning at the National Level
The overall MCCH project first appeared in the 3 rd Metropolitan Master Plan in
1976. This plan was officially determined by the Prime Minister, but was created by the
planning division of the National Land Council. In this plan, the MCCH project did not
take any concrete form, but its name appeared: "... the developments of Metropolitan
Central Connection Artery, Northern Trans-Kanto Road, ... should be promoted."' 19 The
project appeared in the subsequent Metropolitan Master Plans. The MCCH project was
also included in the 10* Five-Year Road Development Plan in 1985, and also in the 4th
National General Development Plan in 1987.
Preliminary Negotiation 120
In 1988, the local office of MoC and Yokohama City jointly began information
sessions following the decision of the central government. This was a voluntary process
that was not stipulated by law. The information sessions were held in a typical format.
The authorities first explained the plan with the detailed alignment of the highway. Then,
"question and answer" sessions followed.
(continued)
the recently enacted Administrative Procedure Act. See Shiono, H., "Administrative Guidance," Public
Administration in Japan, University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1984
119 Summary sheet obtained from MoC, Kanto Regional Construction Bureau
120 Interview with Togashi, A., pers. com.
Community groups in the area formed two groups to protest against the project:
Renkyo and Allied Four Community Groups.
Following the process, the authorities changed their plan in three ways:
" reduced the size of Sakae interchange (12ha to 9ha)
" canceled the community road within the Shodo area.
" reduced the size of the tunnel outlet.
These changes were achieved through negotiations between the MoC and the city
only, and did not involve the opposing parties in the actual alteration of the plan.
Urban Planning/Environmental Impact Assessment Process
Urban Planning Process by Yokohama CitV
First, the city tried to start preliminary sessions in August, 1990 with assistance of
local community groups, but the community groups resisted such meetings. Even when
the city government could arrange a meeting place, opponents physically obstructed the
meeting. City officials were not given a chance to explain their plan.
Formal sessions started on December 12. Again, the opponents obstructed the
meetings. They blocked city officials from holding the meeting: they forcefully closed the
entrance of meeting halls so that no one could attend. What the officials did in response
was to explain the plan through amplified speakers outside the hall, which was suddenly
stopped because the residents near the hall claimed that it was extremely noisy. Finally, no
meeting was actually held in the scheduled manner.
On the other hand, an organization supporting the project, which is composed of
business interests organizations in Yokohama, held a meeting to demonstrate their support.
Simultaneously, the city accepted formal letters of opinions from December 14,
1990 for two weeks. About 430,000 letters are submitted. Two thirds of them opposed
to the project. Each opponent submitted more than two letters, and the actual number of
the opponents was found to be less than the proponents. On the contrary, about 60% of
the opinion supporting the project came from outside the city.
The Urban Planning Council did not warrant any of these statements, and
authorized the city's original plan as proposed on May 28, 1991. At the final meeting,
opponents rushed into the city hall to demonstrate their opposition, but the city lined up
about 100 officials in the staircase to stay them from coming into the meeting hall.
Urban Planning Process by the Prefecture
The Kanagawa prefecture started its urban planning process following the decision
by the Urban Planning Council of Yokohama. The prefecture did not hold any information
session. Instead, they held formal public hearings. About five thousand people applied
to appeal their opinion, but the hearing sessions were again disrupted by the opponents.
Prefectural Urban Planning Council reviewed the comments from the public, and
authorized the amendment. The prefectural government formally announced the
amendment to its Urban Plan in 1995.
Environmental Impact Assessment Process by the Yokohama City
Yokohama city then started Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process while
the prefecture was proceeding the Urban Planning process. On May 27, 1992, The city
and prefecture jointly announced that they will initiate the EIA process. First, the city
published their preliminary EIS and accepted letters of opinion for 45 days. Meanwhile,
the city tried to hold information sessions for the preliminary EIS. Again, these sessions
were physically obstructed by the opponents. One of the sessions lasted for 11 hours, and
the opponents enclosed the officials within the hall until early in the morning, when the
police came to help them out. The opponents argued that the information session cannot
be accepted as a valid session, but the city stopped holding meetings claiming that the
meeting was valid. The opposing groups sent protest notes to relevant authorities claiming
that the city should resume the session.
The opposing groups submitted about 120 thousand letters of opinion, although the
total was 140 thousand. According to the ordinance, the city should respond to these
letters in the final EIS. The city published the final EIS in December, 1993. The city
again accepted letters of opinion for 20 days, and the opposing groups submitted 260
thousand letters.
The final EIS was reviewed by EIA review board. In June 1994, The board
announced its evaluation of the EIS, stating that the process was fair, although the following
additional mitigationary measures should be taken.
1. Build another fan to remove emission from the tunnel
2. Reduce the size of open-cut area, add louvers on the open-cut sections
3. Control the emission from the tunnel while reverse-layer exists
4. Use technology to avoid subsidence
5. Create subsidiary wetland, and conserve specific Japanese straw.
The opponents, however, were not satisfied with these conditions, and apparently
offended to know that the process was legitimized.
The city officially announced the EIS in April 1995, and the EIA process ended.
After the Formal Process
Following the formal process, the city started informal negotiations with the
opponents again, but absolutely no progress has been made through this dialogue. The
opponents also petitioned to the Minister of Construction and the head office of the
Environmental Agency.
In addition, they initiated the following lawsuits asking for an injunction against
the project, and two of them have not yet been settled:12 1
1) Hoax Leaflet Problem: The city distributed a leaflet in which a map showing a section
extending 200m would be built underground, which was not true. The group (Renkyo)
requested an audit of the city, claiming that the expenditure on this "hoax leaflet" was not
legitimate. The request was rejected, but the group brought the case to a court. The
group lost the case, but it is not clear whether the group has a plan to appeal.
(Administrative Suit)
2) Land Price Problem: In 1983, the city purchased part of the site from M- Real Estate
for 9,000 yen per square meter. Between 1986 and 88, the city purchased other parts of the
site from other companies for 170,000 yen per square meter. The group raised question
about this difference in price, and again requested an audit. The city rejected the call again,
and the group sued. No judgment has been secured. (Administrative Suit)
3) Developers, who sold the lots to the residents, are being sued. They are being charged
with negligence of telling important facts." (Civil Suit)
Recently, the groups physically obstructed the city's surveying effort.
(continued)
121 Interview with Minagawa, S., leader of the protesting groups; selectman of the Yokohama City Assembly
Comparison of Processes and Outcomes
Introduction
Although the scale of these two projects is quite different, they both involved a
dispute over highway construction with some environmental impacts. I believe the
differences in the two cases tell us something about the advantages of mediation. First, I
will analyze obstacles in using mediation in the Route 2A case and possible obstacles if
mediation is introduced to the YCH case. They are compared to identify what conditions
should be improved to use mediation in the YCH dispute. Then, I will use the four criteria
suggested by Susskind and Cruikshank: Fairness, Efficiency, Wisdom, and Stability - to
discuss and compare the two results. 22
Obstacles to using mediation
First, I analyzed the obstacles when mediation was introduced into the Route 2A
case. As the conflict perpetuated for more than a decade, most of the stakeholders were
interested in dispute resolution except for the highway department. MHD was reluctant to
participate in the effort at the outset. MoDR had troubles in persuading its officials to
come to the table before the first meeting. However, there seemed to be no other big
problems in starting the mediation effort. Obstacles arose only from the MHD's
unwillingness to participate.
Then, I examined possible obstacles when mediation was introduced to the
stakeholders in the YCH case. Officials of MoC might be reluctant to initiate or
participate in mediation. However, MHD was also reluctant in the Route 2A case. In
this point, these two cases have a similar characteristic. The major difference between
these cases would be
122 Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit., pp. 21-33
See also p. 16 of this thesis
Table 3-1: Obstacles to using mediation
in the Route 2A case and the YCH case
No legal mandate
No cost of delayI
No political L
interference
Public
involvement/
participation
requirements
Officials fear to
lose decision-
making authority
Problems in finding
a qualified
mediator
Very little
experience of
mediation
No promise of
definitiveness
L
L
Route 2A
MHD did not have any
obligation to obey the LCC's
denial.
Many fatal accidents happened.
Immediate action was necessary.
Elected members of LCC voted
against the project. A senator
came to a meeting.
No further public involvement
process was required
At the outset, MHD was
reluctant to come to the table
MoDR took initial efforts. It
found a mediator from its
environmental panel of neutrals.
Some stakeholders were
skeptical at first.
The dispute had continued for
more than a decade.
Definitiveness is not important.
L
YCH
It is unlikely that MoC and the
city will lose lawsuits against the
project
Only traffic congestion around
the site is big problem.
Local politics are inactive about
this case. The party in power
supports the project.
No more public participation is
required by laws.
Officials believe that the decision
at the national government can't
be changed.
No professional
mediator/facilitator exists.
No one knows mediation.
Officials don't think this disputes
can be settled and won't expect
definitiveness.
H: high, M: medium, L: low
the treatment of the official's unwillingness to participate. In other words, the success of
the Route 2A case lies in the way highway officials were motivated to come to the table.
By comparing the obstacles in using mediation in these cases, I found two major
obstacles that might be unique in the YCH case (see Table 3-1):
No Political Interference
LCC was composed three "elected" officials, and the LCC's denial of the proposal
by MHD and the town triggered the whole dispute. Without the denial, the case would not
have been referred to DEP, and mediation would not have been used. LCC was not an
organization to evaluate the proposal from the standpoint of environmental protection.
Thus, those who were concerned with its environmental impacts could achieve their goal by
mobilizing the members of LCC. In this way, LCC worked as a instrument to deliver the
aspiration of the environmentalists to have their opinions heard.
In addition, a State Senator came to a meeting, and this changed the tone of
MHD. 123 This was an explicit form of political interference to encourage the use of the
consensual approach.
On the contrary, few political interference to the YCH case has been made. The
leader of the protesting groups stood for the last election and won a seat in the municipal
assembly of Yokohama. However, he has not yet build any coalition with other
representative to substantiate his opposition against the project. The political party in
power of the local legislature, Liberal Democratic Party, is in support of the project. The
city does not have any other representative organization that has power to vote against
official's decisions. Therefore, political pressure is much weaker in the YCH case.
Difficulties in Finding Qualified Mediators
MoDR and DEP had handled disputes over wetland preservation through an
institutionalized program. Thus, they had an expertise to initiate mediation efforts.
MoDR explained mediation to the participants, persuaded them to come to the table, and
managed to set a schedule for the first meeting in lieu of the stakeholders. The office had
an environmental panel of neutrals and could find an mediator in the list. Without these
initial efforts by MoDR, this mediation could have taken a longer time.
The existence of mediation firms around Boston area is another factor that eased
the difficulties in finding mediators. Currently, there are at least ten mediation firms.1 24
In Japan, informal mediation has not yet been used in settling highway disputes.
Each prefecture and the national government have independent organizations for formal
mediation procedures, but they do not work on informal efforts.
Four good outcomes of the consensual approach
Fairness
In the Route 2A case, the dispute continued for more than a decade, while the
stakeholding groups were relatively obvious. MoDR and DEP went to great efforts to
identify the full range of stakeholding groups, and identified NPS and the city of Cambridge
which had not been directly involved in the dispute. Without this preparation before the
actual mediation, these parties might have been left out. The legitimate concern of the city
of Cambridge to protect the quality of its water supply was achieved not only through
mediation, but also by the side agreement with MHD. The mediation effort achieved full
participation of all stakeholders in the Route 2A case. Thus, the process was fair in terms
of participation.
In addition, the participants identified safety as their most important concern in
planning the road. Although an alternative to reduce the number of lanes to three would
have been highly attractive to the environmental faction, they agreed to withdraw it because
it would not be safe enough. Thus, the mediation process encouraged the participants to
(continued)
123 Interview with a representative of LCC, pers. com.
1 Resources page, Consensus, January 1998, MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program
Table 3-2: Comparison of Four Good Outcomes
Route 2A YCH
Fairness / All stakeholders participated Proponents other than
(including those without authorities did not have a
direct influence) chance to voice their concerns.
Key concerns of highway / The process did not identify the
users - safety - was given full range of people affected by
high priority. the proposed highway.
Efficiency / It resolved a ten-year dispute V Nothing productive happened
in less than a year through the required procedures.
Lawsuits followed.
(The process itself might have
been shorter than mediation)
Wisdom / Participants fully understood Disputes over traffic and air
traffic forecasts. quality forecasts were left
Agreement included unattended.
innovative ideas. Other issues were not
considered.
(The project was innovative)
Stability / Communication and Implementation was impeded by
implementation teams were the opponents..
created
consider the interests of the broader public, and they strove to find an agreement that would
be viewed as fair by all sides.
The planning process of the YCH project was not fair in several regards. Most of
the meetings were disrupted by the opponents, and both authorities and protesting groups
did not have a chance to express their concerns. They did rely on various media which
succeeded in polarizing the sides and framing the discussion in "Yes or No to the project"
terms. Legitimate stakeholders, such as other abutters that bore sufferings from the traffic
jam were ignored. Such people might welcome the project because it would alleviate
traffic, but they might also dislike it because it would destroy the environment. The
conventional process did not identify the full range of people with diverse interests in the
highway planning decision.
Efficiency
The mediation effort in the Route 2A case was obviously efficient. The conflict
about the highway design continued for 12 years, and the Town of Lexington and MHD
could not take steps to stop the road accidents. With the assistance of a mediator and
MoDR, they resolved the dispute in nine months.
In the YCH case, the dispute was not settled through the required Urban Planning
and EIA processes, although some changes were made in the initial proposal through the
information meetings. One of the information meetings was disrupted by the protesting
group, and both officials and the groups were locked in the meeting hall until the dawn of
next day, without any constructive discussion. Other meetings were also disrupted, and
nothing productive happened in these sessions. These meetings were obviously
inefficiently managed, and the resources both parties invested in these efforts were wasted.
After the process finished, the protesting groups filed three lawsuits against the city
of Yokohama. One has been dismissed by a district court, but two others are still under
deliberation. If one of the process's purposes was to achieve acceptance of the project, the
process was inefficient in that respect.
Wisdom
Several meetings in the Route 2A case were spent on discussions about traffic.
They first listened to the explanation by the town's traffic engineer, and each party
questioned and analyzed the assumptions and forecasts relying on their own expertise.
They all understood and agreed some other alternatives were not acceptable because of poor
performance in regard to safety. Thus, they developed and shared a way to evaluate
project alternatives.
They also decided not to pave the shoulder along a part of the road. Instead of
paving with conventional materials, MHD agreed to cover with glass or gravel, which they
called "soft materials." This innovative and wise solution would not have been possible if
the department had stuck to its technical standards.
The YCH dispute involved some incompatible assumptions in the technical
analysis. Although the authorities prepared a forecast of environmental impacts for their
EIS, the protesting groups prepared their own scientific studies of air quality which
supported their argument. They also attacked the traffic forecast prepared by the
authorities. Both sides were trapped by the pitfalls of advocacy science. The
conventional process, including the EIA process, did not identify the most useful
information to minimize future risks, and both sides still believe in only their own analyses.
Advocacy science impairs the development and incorporation of wisdom.125
The conventional process did not added any innovative features into the plan.
Since productive discussions did not occur among the parties, the outcome is no wiser than
the initial proposal. However, I would say that the proposal itself was fairly innovative
because almost all parts of the highway were to be built underground.
Stability
The Route 2A case is still thought of as the most successful highway mediation
effort in New England in the past few years.126 The agreement included a mechanism to
ensure enforcement. The stakeholders organized a "communication and implementation
team," which was managed by DEP. However, there were some minor difficulties during
implementation. The parties tried to renegotiate the agreement, and one of them is
125 Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit., p.30
126 Interviews with several mediators and professionals
currently not satisfied with the way DEP dealt with them.127 However, the mediation
process settled the major dispute, and the actual constructions started in September 1997.
It might be too early to discuss the stability of the YCC project because no
construction has begun. However, the protesting group successfully stopped the city's
surveying effort. The city had to survey the site during the New Year holiday season to
avoid the disruption. If the level of contention on the resident's side is sustained, the
protesting groups will probably try to use more radical measures to stop the project, which
will put the implementation of the project in doubt.
127 Interview with a representative of LCC, pers. com.
Chapter 4
Alternative to the Conventional Process in Japan
- a thought experiment -
Introduction
Although mediation and consensus building have been used successfully to settle
highway disputes in the United States, there is still a question as to whether these
techniques can be applied in the Japanese context. Different planning processes and other
considerations, such as Japanese culture, might impede their successful application.
Misunderstandings of the consensus building process might also hinder its acceptance. In
this chapter, I will conduct a thought experiment to identify the likely problems associated
with the application of consensus building techniques to the case discussed in the previous
chapter.
In this experiment, I prepared a proposal describing what could have happened if
consensus building was used in the planning of the Yokohama Circular Highway South
project before the conflict crystallized. The proposal, with a short description of the actual
process, was circulated to Japanese professionals with experience and knowledge in
highway planning. My questionnaire asked 1) their general attitude toward public
participation; 2) whether they think consensus building can be used in Japan; 3) what the
problems in its application might be; 4) what can be done to improve its applicability; and
5) how they perceive its advantages and disadvantages. Their responses provide the basis
of my advice regarding the use of consensus building in highway planning.
Consensus Building Proposal
Purpose and Assumptions
My consensus building proposal was prepared for professional consideration.
Therefore, it is not the actual proposal put forward in this thesis. Instead, their reviews
and comments are an integral part of my proposal along with other conclusions discussed in
the previous chapters.
There are several key assumptions in the consensus building process. First, I
assumed that the actual dispute of the YCH case would be completely avoided if the
authority used the consensus building process successful in the United States. This is an
assumption that should be tested by the professionals in Japan. However, their
disagreement with the proposal does not imply that consensus building is totally
inapplicable in Japan. Instead, their comments on how to revise the process to fit the
Japanese context will be thoroughly examined and integrated into my final proposal.
There are some elements that cannot be understood until the consensus building
process is actually used in Japan. Professional mediators or facilitators practicing informal
mediation/facilitation to settle policy-related disputes do not exist in Japan. Thus, the
second assumption of the proposal is that the actual person who will take the facilitator's
role is left to the reviewer's inference. Costs and time necessary to reach an agreement are
also difficult to calculate before actual application. These elements vary significantly -
even among the past mediation efforts in the United States. Thus, the third assumption is
that the cost and time involved in using consensus building are not knowable.
Proposal
The English version of my proposal was prepared with the assistance of Professor
Lawrence Susskind. It suggests using a forum, called a Consensus Building Advisory
Committee, to facilitate dialogue among diverse stakeholders before starting a formal
processes. The proposal is comprised of three elements describing 1) how the committee
should be created; 2) how the committee meetings should be conducted; and 3) what might
happen and what should be done after reaching an agreement. Then, it was translated into
Japanese and mailed to the 14 professionals in Table 4-2.
Creating An Advisory Committee
To help initiate a credible consensus building effort, the authorities should have
created an Advisory Committee.128 The aim of the Advisory Committee should have been
to think about who should have been asked to participate. It should also have set a ground
rules and an agenda stipulating the way in which meetings would be conducted, as well as a
time table and a budget support to ensure adequate involvement of all stakeholders.
A professional facilitator 129 should be invited to assist the Committee. The
facilitator needed be perceived by all stakeholders as non-partisan. He/she should have
been asked to conduct the process not as a delegate of the authorities, but as a neutral
manager. The authorities would still have retained the formal decision-making authority,
but they would sit at the table as participants.
Before the first meeting of the Advisory Committee, the facilitator should have
contacted a whole range of local community groups, elected councilors, and distinguished
figures in the area. With information collected through fast-hand observation, secondary
sources, and interviews, the facilitators should have been able to identify the interests of the
various stakeholding groups.
The facilitator should then have invited people to attend the first Advisory
Committee meeting. He/she should have announced the meeting of the Committee
through various media to inform all possible participants.
For preparation, the facilitators should have helped the community groups to
choose their spokespeople. The facilitator might have tried to reduce the number of
128 Shimon-Iinkai in Japanese
129 Giji-Sokushin-Sha in Japanese
participants involved by combining several groups with similar views and interests.
Then, the facilitator should have submitted draft ground rules to the Committee.
The ground rules must have stipulated the ways in which the meetings would be conducted.
They could also have suggested a time table, acceptable behavior of the participants, and
rules for dealing with the media. The participants would have had a chance to review a
draft of the ground rules before the first meeting.
Finally, the facilitator should have prepared a draft agenda for the Advisory
Committee to consider. The agenda would have stipulated the items to be discussed by
the Committee. By that time, the facilitator should know the interests of the participants
through interviews and meetings, and should be able to suggest an agenda for the
Committee to finalize. In addition, the authorities should have promised to follow the
recommendation of the Advisory Committee if an informal consensus was reached.
The Structure of the Advisory Committee
The aim of the Advisory Committee would be to reach an agreement on the project.
However, this process would produce recommendations. The authorities would use the
recommendations as the basis for their decision-making.
The Committee would also produce newsletters to inform the public of its work.
At the outset, the facilitator could take the initiative to publish the newsletters, but he/she
would gradually try to have the Committee members assume their responsibility.
Membership:
Before holding the first meeting, the facilitator and the participants should check
the membership of the Committee. They should search for people with other interests that
are not represented on the Committee, and make sure to invite them to the first meeting so
that the process will be viewed as fair. Its size does not have to be limited, but the
facilitator should encourage the Committee to stay as small as possible and to avoid
augmenting the influence of a particular party by mobilizing as many people as possible
(meetings should be open to public). There have been successful cases where the number
of committee members has exceeded 50.
The Committee and facilitator should also check to determine whether each
representative really represents his or her constituents. Some of the members might not be
in a position to commit to an agreement because they lack authority within their
organization. If so, the Committee should try to replace such members, or should be
aware of the limits on their authority. In addition, the facilitator should try to understand
how much skill and knowledge each member has so that he/she can organize the following
activities appropriately.
First Meeting:
The first meeting of the Consensus Building Advisory Committee should be held
at local an elementary school or community hall. The facilitator should lead the meeting
according to the ground rules and the agenda approved by the Committee. Anyone who
wants to participate should be invited to the meeting, but the facilitator should chair the
meeting to avoid disorder. If he/she finds someone with a view that is substantially
different from any of the committee members, the group can add that person as a member.
The facilitator should explain why and how an agreement will yield a better outcome for all
the participants than a legal battle or ongoing political demonstrations.
Stakeholder Analysis:
The facilitator should prepare a Stakeholder Analysis. This is a report describing
1) a list of the concerns of all categories of stakeholders, including those who don't
participate in the Committee, 2) a list of stakeholders who should be invited to join the
Committee, and 3) suggested goals, tasks, and activities of the Committee. This should be
prepared by the facilitator based on comprehensive interviews. A Stakeholder Analysis
gives the participants an overview of the different concerns and interests of all stakeholding
groups so that they can make sure that all concerns are addressed by the Committee. It
also helps them understand the process of consensus building that the Committee will
follow.
Orientation:
The facilitator can also advise the Committee members on inviting distinguished
professionals to offer lectures on relevant issues. These professionals should be selected
because they are neutral with respect to the outcome of the process. In addition, their
expertise should be considered to be superior to those of the stakeholders. The facilitator
can help the Committee to find appropriate experts.
Such lectures can bring those participants without enough scientific knowledge up
to a level where they can debate the issues more effectively..
Role Playing Exercises:
Role Playing Exercises can help the participants become more effective negotiators.
Every participant of a simulation has to play the role according to a set of assigned rules,
not to their actual positions. For example, those who are protesting the project will be
assigned to play a role of the authorities. This exercise can help the Committee members
build understanding of the other party's positions.
Subcommittees:
Following discussions in the Committee sometimes in several meetings, the
facilitator should be able to identify a few key issues that need to be negotiated. The
facilitator should advise the participants to form subcommittees, in which the participants
will discuss intensively these topics. For example, they can form an Air Quality
Subcommittee and a Natural Environment Subcommittee. The facilitator should also chair
these meetings of the subcommittees according to the general ground rules approved by the
groups.
The general meetings of the Committee should be held periodically even after the
subgroups are formed. The discussions in each subgroup should be used to update the
general meetings.
Joint Fact Finding:
The members of each subcommittee should jointly investigate current conditions,
and forecast the potential impacts of the various project options, and consider the pros and
cons of moving forward in different ways. For example, the circulation of air around the
area and the projection of the air quality will be investigated by the participants.
Consultants and professors assisting the authorities and proponents should
participate in this process to elucidate their assumptions through modeling and forecasting.
Contending parties tend to agree with scientific evidences only which support their own
arguments. This is called advocacy science. To disengage the parties from advocacy
science, the differences in assumptions should be clarified.
A skilled facilitator should be able to divert the participants' attention from the
contending interests to fact-finding. He/she should be careful not to let the participants
advocating the evidence that supports their own interests.
Brainstorming:
The Committee with the help of subcommittees should invent as many options as
possible before trying to frame an agreement. The aim of the effort should be to create an
alternative that is satisfactory to all the parties. During this process, the options proposed
by the participants should not be evaluated until the facilitator determines that no more
options can be invented. With such a condition, the participants become more creative
without the fear of personal attack.
To help the participants to invent options, a technique called brainstorming should
be used. The facilitator is extremely important in this technique. In brainstorming
sessions, the facilitator collects the ideas for options from the participants. A recorder,
who keeps a record of the comments, is often used to assist the facilitator to build a group
memory. The facilitator admonishes those who make rebuttals or criticisms against
options that are suggested. The facilitator also pays attention to the fairness and the
effectiveness of the meeting. For example, he/she should use the skill and the ground
rules to direct the attention to those who make few comments, or to deal with people who
cause problems.
For example, the parties might suggest more greenery on the road, reduced number
of lanes, development of a park, and improvements in public transportation. The formal
Urban Planning process has not started, and it is not painful for the authorities to change
their initial proposal. In fact, it is normal to change the plan at this stage.
Packaging -Dealing with Differences-:
When the facilitator finds that the participants have no additional options to
suggest, he/she should start meetings to negotiate the final agreement. The key to reaching
an agreement is the mutual gains approach. The participants should try to identify items
they value differently, and combine several of them into a package. For example, the
residents may put much higher value on cleaner air than on the traffic volume. The
authorities may want to secure as much traffic volume as possible even at a great expensive.
If so, they both may agree with a plan to build another ventilation fan for the cleaner air and
one more lane for the higher traffic volume.
Some participants might be reluctant to make an initial offer to settle because they
worry about being perceived as weak. In such cases, the facilitator should contact each
participant privately, and identify what kind of deal is possible. He/she should keep the
information gathered through the interviews confidential. When the facilitator identifies a
possible deal among the parties, he/she should suggest the deals in the Committee. In this
manner, the facilitator can assist the parties in reaching an agreement that is beneficial to all
the parties, without making any of them look weak. The facilitator should take care to
remain neutral during the process. In other words, he/she should not be seen as advocating
more strongly for one proposal than another.
Drafting/Signing Recommendations:
The facilitator should draft the final agreement using what is called a single text
approach. He/she should bring a draft around to the parties, and ask each to improve it.
The agreement should be titled "Recommendations of the Advisory Committee."
The recommendations should be signed by all the Committee members after they
have had a chance to present the draft to their constituents. The facilitator should help
each representative in gaining support for the agreement within their organization.
The Formal Urban Planning and Environmental Impact Assessment Process
Even if the parties do reach an agreement, the authorities still need to go through
the formal Urban Planning and Environmental Impact Assessment processes. The
authorities should propose a plan that builds on the consensus reached and is in line with
the Recommendation offered by the Committee.
In the Urban Planning process, the authorities should hold brief informational
sessions in accordance with the usual practice. Contrary to what usually happens, it is
unlikely that community groups will protest against a plan if they helped to create it.
In the EIA process, the authorities should try to use the data collected through the
joint fact-finding process of the Committee. These data will save time and cost in
preparing the Environmental Impact Statement. In addition, the community groups might
revolt if different data are produced by the EIS.
Monitoring
The members of the Advisory Committee should confirm that their forecasts were
reasonable and participate in post-implementation monitoring efforts. Monitoring needs to
be conducted by all the relevant parties. The Committee may include a clause in its
agreement to create a Monitoring Committee. All members of the Committee should be
involved. It is desirable to stipulate compensatory measures in the recommendations in
case significant discrepancies from the forecast become apparent.
Questionnaire and Response
Questionnaire
To figure out the problems likely to arise in applying the consensus building
process, I prepared the following questionnaire to go with the proposal (see Table 4-1).
The questionnaire has two parts; one focused on attitudes toward public participation, and
the other deal with the response to my specific proposal. The first part identifies the
professionals' views about the need for public participation in general. It also clarifies
how open each individual is to my proposal because they are not, they are less likely to
accept my proposal. The second part identifies the specific problems in the application of
consensus building to the highway planning process in Japan. This part also questions
their perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of the process in light of the four
criteria suggested by Susskind and Cruikshank.130 Negative responses to the proposal
identify their major concerns and the obstacles to encouraging the use of consensual
approaches in Japan.
The proposal and questionnaire, with a short explanation of the actual process in
the YCH project, were sent to professionals working on highway-related planning or
projects in the following four categories:
" Government officials
" Professors
" Activists/Lawyers
" Consultants
They were chosen from my personal contacts and other second-hand contacts.
Government officials are MoC employees in the Road Bureau with several different
backgrounds. Some of them are working in its headquarters, and others are in local field
130 Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit., pp. 21-33
Table 4-1. Questionnaire about the Proposal
I. I will ask you general questions:
1. How long practical experience do you have?
2. Do you think that some improvements are necessary for consensus building
efforts in highway planning process in Japan? Please choose one from the
below:
Strongly necessary / Somewhat necessary / Mostly unnecessary / Not necessary at all
3. Which phrase below best fits your opinion about the direct participation of
citizens or residents in consensus building efforts in each highway design
process
Should be increased / No change / Should be decreased
II. I will ask about the Consensus Building Process proposal
1. Do you think that the Consensus Building Process proposal can be realized?
Choose one that most fits your opinion: Yes / No / Don't know
(If your answer is "No," please skip to Question 3)
2. (If you answered "Yes" for Question 1)
How might the Consensus Building proposal be changed to enhance
successful implementation?
3. (If you answered "No" for Question 1)
What are the major problems that makes the proposal impossible?
4. (If you answered "No" for Question 1)
How might the Consensus Building proposal be changed to make it possible?
5. Compared with the actual process, what advantages and disadvantage do you
see in the proposal in regard to the four key words: Fairness, Efficiency,
Wisdom, and Stability?
6. Who might be able to perform the professional neutral's role in Japan?
7. Please indicate other people I should talk to about these ideas.
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Table 4-2: List of Interviewees
Government officials
V Yusho Ishikawa, MoC, Road Bureau, Planning division
/ Mitusio Arino, MoC
/ Shinji Fukushima, MoC, Kanto Regional Construction Bureau
/ Atsuhide Togashi, MoC, Kanto Regional Construction Bureau, Yokohama Road Construction Office
(The current project manager of the YCH project)
Professors
Members of Road Council
" Shigeru Morichi, Professor, University of Tokyo, Department of Civil Engineering
" Haruo Ishida, Professor, Tsukuba University, Department of Social Engineering
- Tetsuo Yai, Assoc. Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Department of Engineering
Other Professor
V Hideaki Shiroyama, Visiting Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Activists/Lawyers
, Shohei Sakawa, Lawyer
(worked with community groups to fight against some infrastructure projects in the Osaka region)
Consultants
/ Kotaro Nagasawa, Mitsubishi Research Institute
offices. Three professors were members of the Road Council, which promoted public
involvement in their policy report. Some other professors were the members of a research
team set up by JH which conducted research on public participation issues in several
countries. Activists/lawyers are individuals or groups that have been working to protest
several kinds of national infrastructure projects. Consultants are those who have
conducted research on public involvement policies or who are practicing neighborhood
planning. Most of these people are nationally recognized figures with a prospect of
changing the national policy on handling disputes over infrastructure projects.
Ten individuals have responded to the questionnaire: four from MoC, four
professor, one lawyer, and one consultant (see Table 4-2). One of the officials gave a
general comment. Table 4-3 shows the summary of their responses.
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Table 4-3 (a): Summary of Responses
Government Officials (3) Professors (4)
Years of Experience 8.7 19
Is it necessary to improve the Moderately Necessary: 2 Strongly Necessary:3
process? Almost Unnecessary:1 Moderately Necessary: 1
Should residents have more No: 3 Yes:4
chances of participation?
Is it likely that the proposal No: 3 Yes:2
can be realized? No:1 (Yes/No:1)
What should be changed to Clarify the way to select committee
make it more likely? members
Use of survey to identify
proponent's views
Improve the measure to involve
public officials
V Deal with value disputes
What are the problems that / Difficulties in finding a facilitator Issues to be discussed: "Build or
makes it impossible? / Less influence of Silent majority not" or design aspects only?
/ No coordination with other areas V Some organization might just resist
/ Difficulties in reaching an agreement participation
due to NIMBY syndrome Trained facilitator doesn't exist
Facilitator's work is too much
What should be V Require a deadline Clarify the scope of discussion and
changed to realize it? V Assume an implementation of the decision-making authority
project V Don't assume an unanimous
/ Don't require an unanimous agreement agreement
I Develop knowledge of facilitation
What are pros and cons in ter ms of the 6loving bur cr iter ia?
Fairness + Evaluation with a broad range of 4 Transparency of the process
opinions + Disruptions can't be avoided with
+ Conspicuous participants become the proposal
influential
_ Only regional egoism prevail
Efficiency + Implementation is easier if realized 4 Smooth implementation
+ Take too long time to reach an agreement 4 Delay in the short run
Wisdom + More information will be shared + Consensus building techniques will
+ Evoke misunderstandings with more be shared
information
Stability + If realized, mutual trust and possibility + will increase
increase (but there is a limit in building
(but not likely to reach an agreement) consensus)
Who can take the facilitator's / Professors / Consultants
role? / Local officials / Professors/ Officials
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Table 4-3 (b): Summary of Responses
Activists/Lawyers (1) Consultants (1)
Years of Experience 25 15
is it necessary to improve the Strongly Necessary: 1 Moderately Necessary: 1
process?
Should residents have more Yes: 1 Yes:1
chances of participation?
Is it likely that the proposal Yes: 1 No: 1
can be realized?
What should be changed to Choose an appropriate person for the
make it more likely? facilitator
Clarify investments in the joint fact
finding efforts (time/size of research)
V Committee members should have strong
characters and knowledge
What are the problems that Existence of a person perceived as
makes it impossible? neutral by all stakeholders
V Effort to reduce the number of
members will aggravate some
groups
Facilitator's work is extremely hard
What should be Clarify payment structure
changed to realize it? V Secure facilitator
V Reduce workload of facilitator
V Set up support staff for facilitator
V Enforce those resist to participate
What are pros and cons in ter ms of the 6Iowing bur cr iter ia?
Fairness + Better than the conventional process + Depends heavily on the
4 Possible unfair outcomes facilitator's personality
Efficiency + Can avoid conflicts afterwards + Facilitator's proposals may escalate
+ Paternalistic decision-making might be the conflict
more "efficient"
Wisdom + The best consequence of consensus
building
Stability (Depends on the discussions in the (Depends heavily on the facilitator's
committee ) skill)
Who can take the facilitator's V Professors / Members of Eminent Domain
role? V Consultants Committee(He doubts the existence of skilled person V Heads of local school boards
who can finish the tasks.) V Local professor
(Too hard for lawyers)
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General Attitude Toward Public Participation
Eight out of nine professionals, including two government officials, identified that
the current process could be improved. Thus, they recognize that the current practice is
not perfect and are inclined to consider alternative ways to build consensus. The one who
answered in the negative tone was the project manager of the YCH project who actually
conducted the process.
However, their perception about the need for more direct participation was spilt
between government officials and others. All three government officials thought there
wasn't a need, and others thought there was. This indicates that the government officials
are more reluctant to accept the idea of face-to-face meetings with stakeholders.
Response to the Conseusus Building Proposal
General Response
Although they seem to be open to the idea of improved public participation efforts,
five out of nine, including all the officials, responded that the proposal would probably not
work. A lawyer and two professor agreed that it would work. The majority of responses
doubt the prospect of my proposal, but these negative responses do not indicate that
consensus building cannot be used in Japan. A professor indicated a need to study
successful application of the consensual approach in the United States to explore the
possibility of using it in Japan.. Their concerns need to be investigated thoroughly to
modify my proposal and develop strategies for promotion.
What are the Problems?
The responses pointed diverse problems associated with the application of the
consensual approach. For example, one professor could envision difficulties in settling
value disputes. However, there are four key problems raised in most of the responses.
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1) Difficulties in finding qualified mediators
Almost all the interviewees indicated difficulties in finding qualified facilitators or
mediators in Japan. As I mentioned, professional facilitators or mediators for public
policy disputes do not exist in Japan. Thus, assistance should be sought from someone
who engage in other professions and can be perceived impartial and neutral by all the
stakeholders. Many responses raised the difficulties in finding such a person in Japan.
They suspected that no one would be perceived neutral by all.
In addition, four interviewees worried that the facilitator's workload would simply
be too much. Even the lawyer, who answered most positively, questioned this point.
Such a fear could have developed because the proposal did not suggest a possibility of
using a team of facilitators and assistants. Some others focused on the facilitator's
personality. They argue that facilitators/mediators should have a strong character to
accomplish their work.
2) Representation
Two government officials raised the silent majority problem. It is a notion that
the majority of stakeholders tend not to express their concerns because they do not have
incentive to do so. They suspected that arguments of conspicuous groups would prevail
and the agreement would be unfairly beneficial to these groups. However, my proposal
argues that the committee will involve all stakeholders, which implied the full
representation of such silent people. Although these answers partly ignored my proposal,
they implied their strong concern about the representation of the silent majority.
A professor questioned that some parties would not participate if the project is
unlikely to be suspended. There were some other responses similar to this argument.
Opponents' participation might be a big issue in Japan considering their past efforts to
disrupt the participatory processes. Some professors also indicated that people in general
do not have ability to debate public issues effectively.
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3) The NIMBY Syndrome
The third issue is the official's strong perception of disputes as nothing more than
131the NIMBY (Not-In-My-BackYard) syndrome . One official argued that the highway
disputes will not be settled because most of the residents are only interested in shifting the
project site and would simply try to push them out of their communities. Other two
officials also mentioned NIMBYism.
4) Official's Fear/National Planning
The fourth issue is the fear of the project being denied by the agreement.
Especially the officials contend that the project should be planned from a broad perspective
and should not be abandoned based only on a local decision.
This problem is also raised by professors in another way. They argued that
participation should be taken at the national or regional levels. In fact, the majority of
professors are the members of Road Committee which used public involvement in creating a
national plan.
What can be done?
Some interviewees suggested some possible improvements in the process while
doubting the prospects for my proposal.
Many interviewees considered that a unanimous agreement would be impractical
and should not be considered as a ground rule because some participants might not agree to
any agreement. They suggested that the authorities should have the power to force the
committee to reach an agreement because some members would not agree with any
alternatives. These suggestions might reflect their misunderstanding about the process
because the authorities still retains their right to act unilaterally. One of the government
officials also mentioned the use of a deadline which had already been included in the
proposal.
131 It is also called LULU (Locally Unwanted Land Use) syndrome
106
Two officials and a professor suggested that the consensus building process should
proceed with the assumption that the project will be implemented. This derives from their
fear that the project might be canceled through the process. However, no one mentioned
such an assumption might discourage the participation of some parties.
The consultant was particularly concerned with the facilitator's hard work,
including his/her security. He suggested a possibility of a team of facilitators, which
should have been made explicit in my proposal.
Pros and Cons of the Proposal
Most of the responses acknowledged the four good outcomes of the negotiated
settlement. However, they also indicated that such a settlement would not be possible in
Japan
Fairness: In general, they valued the transparency of the process and the integration of
Efficiency:
diverse interests. Officials worry that the agreement can be unfairly
beneficial only to the participants, especially strong ones. A consultant and
a professor thought fairness depended on the facilitator.
They agreed that the implementation of the project would go smoothly if the
agreement were reached. Instead, they thought the process was inefficient
in that the consensus building process would take more time than the
conventional process.
Wisdom: Most interviewees considered consensus building was most effective in this
aspect. Information-sharing aspects of the proposal were perceived well,
even by the government officials. One of the official feared that technical
information would create more misunderstandings by residents.
Stability: They agreed that the agreement would be stable, although many of them
doubted the possibility of reaching such an agreement.
Who can take the facilitator's role?
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The professionals suggested some candidates, but many of them also indicated that
it might be impossible to find a person who can actually take the mediator's role. As is
found in the responses to the previous questions, they were highly concerned with the
problems in finding qualified mediators.
Conclusion
Four key problems and concerns of the professionals have been identified. They
must be fully attended before these officials would consider the actual application of the
consensus building process to a highway dispute in Japan. Some of their concerns were
based on misunderstandings, but they should not be dismissed. Instead, my proposal must
address these misunderstood elements more clearly and explicitly next time.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
- Five Strategies to Promote
the Consensual Approach to Highway Planning in Japan-
Introduction
I have discussed the prospects and pitfalls of using the consensual approach in
highway planning. The analysis in Chapter 2 suggests three major differences between the
United States and Japan: No Legal Mandate, Political Interference and Difficulties in
finding qualified mediators. The thought experiment identified four key concerns that
professionals in Japan have: Difficulties in finding qualified mediators; Representation;
Strong perception of disputes as nothing more than the NIMBY syndrome and; Fear of the
project being denied by the agreement.
Given these findings, what should be done to promote the consensual approach in
Japan? I will propose five strategies to promote its uses in highway planning in Japan.
Strategy 1
Remove misperceptions about the consensual approach.
As we have seen in the thought experiment, many officials misunderstood some
important aspects of the consensual approach. One of the officials suggested setting a
deadline, even though that is typically included in the ground rules of a consensus building
process. These misperceptions might be based on assumptions of the traditional public
participation efforts.
All public officials were concerned about the silent majority, and they suspected
such a majority would not be represented on an Advisory Committee. However, one
feature of all consensus building process is to ensure that such silent people are included.
In the conventional process, those protesting against highway projects mobilize to raise
concerns about the negative impacts of proposed highways. Those who want to express
their support, or those who want to discuss particular problems in a constructive manner
often feel reluctant to come to such sessions because they want to avoid such controversies.
Thus, the problem of the silent majority is created by the conventional process! Instead,
mediation tries to bring all possible stakeholders, both for or against the project together, to
eliminate the possibility of leaving out legitimate concerns. In other word, the mediator's
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convening effort is to ensure the silent majority is represented.
Some interviewees worried that consensus building would lead nowhere and
disruptions by opponents would continue. If the process is poorly managed, such a
disastrous situation could prevail. However, government officials still retain their
authority to proceed with their initial proposal if an agreement can not be reached through
mediation. The officials insisted in the thought experiment that the national highway
projects be implemented because they were decided on at the national level. In other
words, the officials working on project planning do not have authority to withdraw projects.
Thus, in mediation, they should enunciate their limited authority, and if mediation cannot
resolve the conflict by a set deadline, that should trigger the conventional process.
These misperceptions, especially those of government officials, must be rebuffed
in order to promote the use of the consensual approach in Japan. Possible strategies
include 1) introduction to mediation for government officials with an emphasis on their
concerns; 2) publication of literature on mediation in Japanese; 3) seminars for public
officials to learn more about mediation. These misperceptions are not obstacles.
Strategy 2
Encourage government officials to try the consensual approach in less controversial or
small projects.
After learning how mediation really works, government officials should use the
consensual approach in actual highway planning. However, they may well feel that it is
too risky to use a new approach in major highway projects. Officials at field offices might
not have the authority to withdraw a whole project, and they might suspect that anti-
highway groups would not come to table without a possibility of stopping a project.
At this moment, it might be too burdensome for some officials to apply the
consensual approach to a whole stretch of highway. Instead, they should try on a part of a
project they are planning. For example, they can initiate a consensus building effort to
design a bus stop on a highway. With the assistance of a facilitator, the officials might
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negotiate with stakeholders such as neighbors, elderly community groups, and disabled
persons. It is unlikely that discussions over a bus stop would become a huge dispute that
could bog down a highway project. Free from the risks they fear, officials could
experience and understand how the consensual approach can achieve a productive outcome.
The consensual approach should also be promoted to the government officials in
other fields. Participatory community development by municipal governments is now
growing in popularity. Officials involved in community development should be
encouraged to use facilitators to assist with their participatory planning efforts. Compared
to the officials in highway departments, they should be more eager to use the consensual
approach.
As the application of the consensual approach spreads, the likelihood of official
acceptance should increase. Hands-on experience should be convincing. Successful
applications will dispel the doubts of officials without experience with mediation. They
might gradually want to use mediation in more confrontational situations like the YCH
project.
Another important side effect of small scale experiments would be the cultivation
of professional facilitators and mediators. Individuals trying to take the facilitator's role in
Japan would be more motivated to start their career in less confrontational situations with
lower stakes. Most of the interviewees in the thought experiment questioned the
availability of professional neutrals in Japan. However, the number of professional
neutrals will probably increase as the demand for neutrals enlarges, and the problem with
availability will be reduced.
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Strategy 3
Encourage professors and other neutral individuals to assist informal negotiations
To deal with the shortage of professional mediators in Japan, professionals in the
public policy field in general should be encouraged to take the role of facilitator/mediator.
Many interviewees in the thought experiment mentioned professors as a good candidate.
Current or past members of the Prefectural Eminent Domain Council and the Prefectural
Environmental Dispute Coordination Commission also seem to be possible mediators.
These members are now working as non-partisan neutrals in formal procedures. The latter
has achieved several successes in mediating highway disputes through the formal
process.132 Private consultants might be able to take the facilitator's role in less
controversial projects, such as the bus stop example above. Public officials of MoC might
find difficulties to take the role because of the small likelihood to be accepted as a non-
partisan neutral. Officials in other agencies, such as Environmental Agency, might be a
possible option.
These people might reluctant to invest their resources to become
facilitators/mediators because informal mediation and consensus building in highway
planning has scarcely used in Japan. However, considering their success in the United
States, these approaches will probably draw more attentions even in Japan in a few years.
For professors in public policy departments, mediation should be a good topic for their
research. For private consultants and individuals, the skill of facilitation and mediation
will be profitable in the future. The skills of facilitation can also be applied to increase the
effectiveness of their business meetings. They should be aware that the chances to take
the mediator's role are attractive enough to give it a try.
The concerns found in the thought experiment, especially those expressed by a
consultant, involved personal risks and payment structure. Considering the recent assaults
against elected officials by militant pro-development factions in Japan, it is reasonable that
132 Harashina, S., "Environmental Dispute Resolution in Road Construction Projects in Japan," Environmental
Impact Assessment Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1988, pp. 29-41
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people are afraid to become involved in public disputes. Thus, they should start from less
controversial cases. Of course, those who are willing to deal with controversial projects
should be respected, but encouraging the ordinary professionals to do so may jeopardize
their curiosity to use the consensual approach in other non-controversial projects.
Payment can be structured flexibly because consensus building is an informal process.
Professors might be willing to do so pro bono if they consider their experience as a part of
their research. If the professionals want a specific price list, the payment structures of the
state offices of dispute resolutions in the United States will give them a direction.
Strategy 4
Mobilize political actions to encourage the use of the consensual approach
As seen in Chapter 2, political interference with highway planning processes
stimulated the move to the consensual approach in the United States. Although there have
been some frustrating experiences, effort should be made to convince public officials to try
the consensual approach.
Some readers may find the difficulty of political interference in the Japanese
culture, but that assumption is not true. For example, there was a referendum in a rural
town that banned a construction of a nuclear power plant proposed by the national
government. Even in Japan, such local protests have been able to mobilize political
actions to stop particular projects. However, they only succeeded in rejecting what they do
not like but failed in achieving what they want. These radical actions did not produced
good outcomes of the consensual approach described in Chapter 1.
Instead, these political interference should be used to encourage the use of
consensual approach. For example, a newly elected mayor of the city of Musashino
canceled a construction project of a waste management plant and ordered his subordinate to
use a participatory process to restudy the best site for the plant even in the early 1980s. A
change in mayoral position can influence the planning process within his/her jurisdiction.
Although there have not yet been any example, a mayor can use the consensual approach in
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amending a national highway project to the city's Urban Plan because the formal Urban
Planning process is conducted by each municipal government. However, governors might
not be able to take such action because they are to amend the prefectural Urban Plan in lieu
of the Minister of Construction, which is stipulated by the Urban Planning Act.
Those advocating environmental protection from highway projects should reframe
their opposition against the projects. They should mobilize the politicians to give
pressures on the officials to use the consensual approach rather than to stop the whole
projects. Such an action is more likely to be accepted by the highway officials, and they
should be able to achieve their sincere desire to protect their environment.
Proposal 5:
Integrate the consensual approach into the formal environmental mediation
procedures
Finding an appropriate mediator is not an easy task. Even after mediation and
consensus building are extensively used in small or less controversial projects, public
officials without any connection with mediators may have difficulties in reaching them.
Thus, the difficulty in finding qualified mediators might remain as it is for these officials.
To clear the problem, the network of mediators should be substantiated to make them
available throughout Japan.
Currently, Japan has formal environmental mediation process based on the
Pollution Dispute Resolution Act. Prefectural and national independent commissions
conducting mediation and other dispute resolution efforts with quasi-judicial status. They
are institutionalized to deal with appeals seeking relieves from pollution before going to
courts. They can also deal with non-existent pollution as "possible pollution," and some
infrastructure projects have been between mediated though the process. Such appeals
have been increasing recently.13 3
I suggest that these formal mechanism be transformed to facilitate informal
133 Kougai-to-Chosei-Iinkai, Kogai-Funso-Shori-Hakusho (in Japanese), 1997, p. 60
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mediations of environmental disputes, including highway disputes. Currently, the formal
mediation should be conducted between only appellants and defendants, but this condition
should be changed to allow the participation of other stakeholders representing diverse
interests. Past mediation efforts through this mechanism could not involve those who
didn't appealed. In addition, the commission cannot be involved in disputes without any
appeal, but they should be able to take more proactive measures in setting up mediation
efforts.
I envision the state offices of dispute resolution in the United States as a model.
The reformed commission will take initial efforts to initiate mediation and send appropriate
mediators from their appointed mediators. If the Pollution Dispute Resolution Act is
improved to allow the commissions to conduct informal mediations, they will be available
throughout Japan. As seen in the Route 2A case, existence of such institutionalized
organization promoting mediation can alleviate the difficulties in finding qualified mediator
substantially. However, the current practice of the commission should be investigated in
more details.
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